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CLEAN ENERGY EQUITY 
 
Felix Mormann* 
 
Abstract 
Solar, wind, and other clean, renewable sources of energy promise to 
mitigate climate change, enhance energy security, and foster economic 
growth. But many of the policies in place to promote clean energy today 
are marred by an uneven distribution of economic opportunities and 
associated financial burdens. Tax incentives for renewables cost 
American taxpayers billions of dollars every year, yet the tax code 
effectively precludes all but the largest banks and most profitable 
corporations from reaping the benefits of these tax breaks. Other policies, 
such as renewable portfolio standards that set minimum quota to create 
demand for renewable electricity require such high levels of market 
expertise and financial acumen that they engender similarly disparate 
social impacts—all in the name of an environmentally sustainable energy 
future. 
To date, policymakers and scholars have focused primarily on the 
efficacy and, more recently, the efficiency of clean energy policy. This 
Article makes the case that the next generation of policies should 
incorporate equity as another first-order consideration in policy design 
and implementation. Properly defined as the commensurate matching of 
costs and benefits, equity offers a more reliable metric for distributional 
impacts than the multitude of competing, normatively charged notions of 
fairness that currently dominate the public discourse. 
Empirical assessment and qualitative analysis of today’s leading 
clean energy policies reveal widespread issues related to equity. Insights 
gleaned from a representative sampling of the global policy potpourri 
yield valuable design recommendations for the next generation of clean 
                                                   
* © 2019 Felix Mormann. Professor of Law, Texas A&M University School of Law. I 
would like to thank the University of Utah S.J. Quinney College of Law’s Wallace Stegner 
Center for honoring me with the Stegner Young Environmental Scholar Award. This Article 
is based on a lecture I gave in connection with the award. For their insightful comments on 
earlier versions, I would like to thank David Adelman, William Boyd, Ann Carlson, Lincoln 
Davies, John Dernbach, Michael Gerrard, Alexandra Klass, Robin Kundis Craig, Hari 
Osofsky, Uma Outka, Troy Rule, David Spence, Amy Stein, and Shelley Welton. I would 
also like to thank participants in Columbia Law School’s Sabin Colloquium on Innovative 
Environmental Law Scholarship, the Workshop on Regional Challenges and Opportunities 
in Energy Transformations co-hosted by the University of Texas and University of 
Minnesota, the Energy Scholars Workshop at Colorado University School of Law, the Searle 
Center Research Roundtable on Energy Regulation at Northwestern University Pritzker 
School of Law, and the Climate & Energy Seminar at UCLA School of Law. For her 
excellent research assistance, I am grateful to Brittany Gunter. Last but not least, I would 
like to thank Kayla Weiser and the rest of my editorial team for their diligent work. 
336 UTAH LAW REVIEW [NO. 2 
energy policies—a generation that, ideally, will be at once effective, 
efficient, and more equitable. 
As the greening grid becomes ever more interactive, so, too, should 
the process that produces the policy landscape driving the clean energy 
transition become more participatory. This Article suggests Elinor 
Ostrom’s polycentricity model as a powerful governance tool to help 
produce more equitable clean energy policies. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
Anthropogenic climate change has made the transition to a clean, low-carbon 
energy economy, or decarbonization,1 a top priority for policymakers around the 
world.2 At the end of 2017, nearly 180 countries across the globe had set targets and 
                                                   
1 Deep decarbonization is commonly defined as “steep reductions in energy-related 
CO2 emissions through a transformation of energy systems.” See, e.g., J.H. WILLIAMS ET 
AL., ENERGEY AND ENVTL. ECON., INC., PATHWAYS TO DEEP DECARBONIZATION IN THE 
UNITED STATES iii (2014), http://unsdsn.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/09/US-Deep-
Decarbonization-Report.pdf [https://perma.cc/8JEW-2EQ6]. 
2 See, e.g., INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE, CLIMATE CHANGE 
2013: THE PHYSICAL SCIENCE BASIS 1102–09 (2013) (discussing the abrupt and perhaps 
irreversible impact and projections of climate changes along with a number of temperature 
thresholds with 2 degrees Celsius being the most prominent target); see also 
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implemented policies to support the build-out of renewable energy infrastructure3—
a more than tenfold increase compared to the fifteen countries reported for 2005.4 
Along the way, the share of low-carbon, climate-friendly renewables in the global 
power mix has grown to over 26 percent.5 The first generation of clean energy 
policies deserves great credit for moving solar, wind, and other renewable energy 
technologies out of the lab and into the marketplace. As these technologies mature 
and their market share continues to grow, however, their enabling policy landscape 
requires rethinking.  
To date, policymakers have focused primarily on the efficacy and, more 
recently, the efficiency of their policy commitment to renewables. Starting in the 
1990s, clean energy policies sought to get as much steel in the ground (and solar 
panels on rooftops) as possible with little, if any, concern for the costs involved.6 
Since the late 2000s, as solar, wind, and other renewables graduated from niche 
markets and entered the mainstream, clean energy policies have been crafted with a 
growing concern for their cost efficiency in order to mitigate the financial burden on 
ratepayers and taxpayers.7 Nearly three decades of efficacy- and, more recently, 
efficiency-oriented policymaking have produced considerable environmental and 
economic benefits.8 Figure 1 illustrates the historic evolution of clean energy 
policymaking. 
                                                   
INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE, RENEWABLE ENERGY SOURCES AND 
CLIMATE CHANGE MITIGATION 6–26 (2011) (discussing the opportunities and challenges 
associated with the ramp-up of low-carbon, renewable energy technologies) [hereinafter 
IPCC, RENEWABLE ENERGY SOURCES]. 
3 JANET L. SAWIN ET AL., RENEWABLE ENERGY POLICY NETWORK FOR THE 21ST 
CENTURY, RENEWABLES 2018 GLOBAL STATUS REPORT 49 (Lisa Mastny et al. eds., 2018) 
[hereinafter REN21 2018]. 
4 JANET L. SAWIN ET AL., RENEWABLE ENERGY POLICY NETWORK FOR THE 21ST 
CENTURY, RENEWABLES 2015 GLOBAL STATUS REPORT 87 (Lisa Mastny ed., 2015) 
[hereinafter REN21 2015]. 
5  REN21 2018, supra note 3 at 41. 
6 See, e.g., INT’L ENERGY AGENCY, FULL COST RATES (2017), 
https://www.iea.org/policiesandmeasures/renewableenergy/ [https://perma.cc/8EJ2-6323] 
(using advanced search, select “Germany” under “Countries” subheading, click search; then 
type “Full Cost Rates” into the “Filter:” bar) (describing Germany’s 1993 “Full Cost Rates” 
program, which offers to cover the full cost of solar photovoltaic installations). 
7 See, e.g., American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-5, 123 
Stat. 115 (establishing the U.S. “Cash Grant” program to remedy renewable energy project 
financing inefficiencies flowing from the 2008/09 financial crisis); see also Lincoln L. 
Davies & Kirsten Allen, Feed-in Tariffs in Turmoil, 116 W. VA. L. REV. 937, 956–58 (2014) 
(describing repeated adjustments to the German feed-in tariff in order to prevent costs from 
getting out of hand). 
8 See, e.g., Kyle Siler-Evans et al., Regional Variations in the Health, Environmental, 
and Climate Benefits of Wind and Solar Generation, 110 PROCEEDINGS NAT’L ACAD. SCIS. 
11768 (2013) (exploring the diverse environmental benefits of renewable energy); Felix 
Mormann et al., A Tale of Three Markets: Comparing the Renewable Energy Experiences of 
California, Texas, and Germany, 35 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 55, 74 (2016) (discussing the job 
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Figure 1: Historical Evolution of Clean Energy Policymaking 
 
The prevailing focus on efficacy and efficiency, however, has led other policy 
considerations, such as equity, to go largely overlooked. As renewables gain ever-
greater traction in the global energy economy, the social impacts of these 
technologies and the policies that support them are becoming more and more salient. 
Today’s crop of clean energy policies creates winners and losers not only across 
competing technologies9 but also among ratepayers, taxpayers, and other 
stakeholders. Federal tax incentives for renewables, for example, cost American 
taxpayers billions of dollars every year, yet the tax code effectively precludes all but 
the largest banks and most profitable corporations from reaping the benefits of these 
tax breaks.10 In much the same vein, renewable portfolio standards require 
ratepayers to finance markets and demand for renewable electricity but require such 
high levels of market expertise and financial acumen that they prove similarly 
exclusive.11  
This disconnect between the allocation of costs and access to the economic 
benefits created by clean energy policy suggests that policymakers prioritize 
environmental and economic outcomes at the expense of equity and social 
                                                   
creation benefits associated with renewable energy deployment in California, Texas, and 
Germany). 
9 See, e.g., Zachary Liscow & Quentin Karpilow, Innovation Snowballing and Climate 
Law, 95 WASH. U. L. REV. 387 (2017) (describing the well-established narrative of public 
policy support for renewable energy technologies picking winners and losers). 
10 See infra Section III.D. 
11 See infra Section III.E. 
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sustainability.12 The resulting disparate social impacts threaten to erode popular 
support for a key component of global efforts to mitigate anthropogenic climate 
change.13 The sudden rollback of Spain’s renewable energy support regime offers 
an illustrative example of these dynamics.14 When Spanish regulators naively chose 
to offer local solar generators rates similar to those of Germany’s then widely praised 
feed-in tariff, these rates proved overly generous given Spain’s 60% greater 
insolation compared to Germany. The resulting windfall profits for developers and 
the hefty financial burden they imposed on Spanish voters caused public support for 
renewables to dwindle and, ultimately, led to the policy’s unraveling. 
A sizeable body of literature has examined the efficacy of policies to promote 
clean energy around the globe.15 More recent scholarship has explored the cost 
efficiency of policies to promote the large-scale deployment of solar, wind, and other 
renewables.16 The scholarly community is only just beginning, however, to explore 
the social challenges posed by the transition to a low-carbon, renewables-based 
                                                   
12 For a discussion of the complex relationships among environmental, economic, and 
social sustainability, see Felix Mormann, Can Clean Energy Policy Promote Environmental, 
Economic, and Social Sustainability?, 33 J. LAND USE & ENVTL. L. 343 (2018). 
13 See Framework Convention on Climate Change, Adoption of the Paris Agreement, 
U.N. DOC. FCC/CP/2015/L.9 (Dec. 12, 2015), https://unfccc.int/resource/docs/2015/cop21 
/eng/l09r01.pdf [https://perma.cc/DS9K-M28X]. The Paris agreement entered into force on 
November 4, 2016, less than a year after its adoption, following ratification by 55 states 
accounting for at least 55% of global greenhouse gas emissions, including the United States. 
See Paris Accord—Status of Ratification, U.N. FRAMEWORK CONVENTION ON CLIMATE 
CHANGE, https://unfccc.int/process/the-paris-agreement/status-of-ratification [https://perma. 
cc/5VEF-A8W9].  
 14 See Felix Mormann, Clean Energy Federalism, 67 FLA. L. REV. 1621, 1661–62 
(2015) [hereinafter Mormann, Clean Energy Federalism] (discussing the equity issues 
prompting the sudden suspension of Spain’s policy incentives for solar facilities). 
15 The International Energy Agency has done foundational work in this space, exploring 
the relative efficacy of renewable energy policies in the OECD and BRIC countries using 
country-specific “effectiveness indicators” based on each country’s renewable energy 
potiential. See INT’L ENERGY AGENCY, DEPLOYING RENEWABLES—BEST AND FUTURE 
POLICY PRACTICE (2011) [hereinafter IEA 2011]; INT’L ENERGY AGENCY, DEPLOYING 
RENEWABLES—PRINCIPLES FOR EFFECTIVE POLICIES (2008) [hereinafter IEA 2008]. See 
generally Gireesh Shrimali et al., Wind Energy Deployment in the U.S.: An Empirical 
Analysis of the Role of Federal and State Policies, 43 RENEWABLE & SUSTAINABLE ENERGY 
R. 796 (2015); Lucy Butler & Karsten Neuhoff, Comparison of Feed-in Tariff, Quota and 
Auction Mechanisms to Support Wind Power Development, 33 RENEWABLE ENERGY 1854 
(2008). See generally Fredric C. Menz, Green Electricity Policies in the United States: Case 
Study, 33 ENERGY POL’Y 2398 (2005).  
16 This stream of research has sought to assess how much bang a policy delivers, in 
renewable energy capacity deployed, for the ratepayers’ or taxpayers’ buck. See generally 
Reinhard Haas et al., Efficiency and Effectiveness of Promotion Systems for Electricity 
Generation from Renewable Energy Sources - Lessons from EU Countries, 36 ENERGY 2186 
(2011); Felix Mormann, Enhancing the Investor Appeal of Renewable Energy, 42 ENVTL. L. 
681 (2012) [hereinafter Mormann, Investor Appeal of Renewable Energy]. 
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energy economy.17 To date, no systematic, comparative inquiry has probed into the 
relative equity of the primary tools of public policy support for clean energy. This 
Article seeks to help close that gap. 
At first glance, equity may seem a less intuitive and harder-to-measure concept 
than efficacy or efficiency, the current staples of clean energy policy. Properly 
defined as the commensurate distribution of costs and benefits,18 however, equity 
offers a reliable metric of a policy’s socio-economic impacts—a metric untainted by 
the normative judgments underlying the many competing notions of fairness that 
dominate the rhetoric in ongoing battles over the future of net energy metering and 
other clean energy policies.19 To be clear, this Article was motivated by the author’s 
normative concerns over equity deficiencies in today’s clean energy policy 
landscape. And these concerns over the uneven distribution of economic 
opportunities and costs form the basis of proposed pathways for policy reform.20  
Not all policymakers, scholars, and other readers will share the author’s 
normative valuation of equity improvements as a worthwhile goal for clean energy 
policy design and implementation. Few will deny, however, that a better 
understanding of the economic winners and losers a policy creates will result in more 
informed choices going forward, for policymakers, voters, and other stakeholders. 
                                                   
17 See generally Shelley Welton & Joel B. Eisen, Clean Energy Justice: Charting an 
Emerging Agenda, HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. (forthcoming 2019) (calling on the academic 
community to engage in a more holistic study of the distributive and procedural justice 
concerns raised by the clean energy transition); Shelley Welton, Clean Electrification, 88 U. 
COLO. L. REV. 571 (2017) [hereinafter Welton, Clean Electrification] (exploring the social 
implications of a “participatory grid”); Uma Outka,  Fairness in the Low-Carbon Shift: 
Learning from Environmental Justice, 82 BROOK. L. REV. 789 (2017) (exploring the linkage 
between climate change and environmental and energy justice); Troy A. Rule,  Solar Energy, 
Utilities, and Fairness, 6 SAN DIEGO J. CLIMATE & ENERGY L. 115 (2015) (taking stock of 
the fairness arguments raised for and against promotion of solar rooftop installations through 
net energy metering). 
18 See, e.g., Benjamin K. Sovacool, An International Comparison of Four Polycentric 
Approaches to Climate and Energy Governance, 39 ENERGY POL’Y 3832, 3841 (2011); 
Welton, Clean Electrification, supra note 17, at 577 n.19 (defining equity concerns as 
“questions over how the benefits and burdens of the policies are allocated”); Daniel A. 
Farber, Pollution Markets and Social Equity: Analyzing the Fairness of Cap and Trade, 39 
ECOLOGY L.Q. 1, 7 (2012) (defining equity as the consideration of “uneven impact of a 
program on different groups or individuals”). Use of the term “equity” for the purposes of 
this Article should not be confused with the term’s use in the context of equity capital or tax 
equity, both staples in the clean energy finance discourse. See, e.g., Felix Mormann, Beyond 
Tax Credits: Smarter Tax Policy for a Cleaner, More Democratic Energy Future, 31 YALE 
J. ON REG. 303 (2014) [hereinafter Mormann, Beyond Tax Credits] (discussing the challenges 
for clean energy finance associated with scarcity of tax equity). 
19 See Rule, supra note 17, at 116 (discussing the confusing use of fairness rhetoric on 
both sides of the raging debate over net energy metering policies with the astute observation 
that “[fa]irness is a notoriously fuzzy concept capable of describing a wide range of distinct 
policy ideals”); Outka, supra note 17, at 793 (stating that “discordant notions of fairness are 
competing for validation in the energy policy space”). 
20 See infra Section III.F. 
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The goal of the following analysis of case studies in clean energy policy,21 therefore, 
is not to sell readers on the author’s normative convictions but, rather, to provide the 
background necessary for readers to form their own normative judgments, including 
but not limited to the “fairness,” of the current policy landscape. To this end, the 
Article’s working definition of equity facilitates an in-depth inquiry into the 
attribution of economic costs and benefits under select clean energy policies, tracing 
the flow of capital required to fund these policies as well as the revenue flowing to 
their economic beneficiaries.22  
Some question the propriety of equity and other indicators of socio-economic 
impact in the context of clean energy policies intended to reduce the world’s carbon 
footprint and thereby help mitigate global climate change. This Article makes the 
case that, in light of its transformative nature and repercussions felt across all sectors 
of society, deep decarbonization cannot proceed successfully without regard for the 
social implications of its enabling policy landscape. Moreover, energy law has long 
recognized equity as a key metric for the design of rates for transmission services, 
electric power, and natural gas, among others.23  
Importantly, this Article does not seek to call into question the ongoing 
transition toward a low-carbon, largely renewables-based energy economy. To be 
sure, reduced reliance on oil, coal, and other carbon-intensive fossil fuels engenders 
its own social challenges, such as jobs lost in mining, refining, and related sectors.24 
But environmental and, ultimately, economic imperatives leave little room for 
alternative courses of action if global warming is to be limited to the crucial 2-degree 
Celsius mark.25 The social costs of persistent carbon emissions from a primarily 
fossil-fueled power sector are simply too large to consider business as usual with 
continued reliance on fossil fuels a viable option.26  
The research goal of this inquiry, therefore, is not to question the “if” but rather 
to assess and, ideally, improve the “how” of the shift toward a less carbon-intensive, 
renewably fueled energy economy. To this end, the Article assesses the equity of a 
                                                   
21 See infra Section III.A–E. 
22 As Professor William Boyd put it in his helpful comments on an earlier draft of this 
work, it is, indeed, a “follow-the-money” type of investigation. 
23 See infra Part I. 
24 See, e.g., DEP’T OF ENERGY, U.S. ENERGY AND EMPLOYMENT REPORT 23 (2017), 
https://www.energy.gov/downloads/2017-us-energy-and-employment-report [https://perma. 
cc/J96A-7D23] (describing the recent decline in employment in oil and gas extraction and 
coal mining compared to job growth in solar and other renewable energy); Shalanda H. Baker 
et al., Beyond Zero-Sum Environmentalism, 47 ENVTL. L. REP. 10328, 10344 (2017) 
(discussing perceived trade-offs between environmentalists and the mining industry). 
25 See supra note 2 and accompanying text. 
26 See, e.g., Jonathan Levy & Jack Spengler, Health Benefits of Emissions Reductions 
from Older Power Plants, 9 RISK IN PERSP. 1, 2–4 (2001) (reporting on the high 
concentration of air pollutants and adverse health impacts in the vicinity of coal and other 
fossil-fueled power plants); Siler-Evans et al., supra note 8; Mathew E. Hauer & Jason N. 
Evans, Millions Projected to Be at Risk from Sea-Level Rise in the Contintental United 
States, 6 NATURE CLIMATE CHANGE 691, 697 (2016) (highlighting the threat of mass 
migration due to anthropogenic climate change). 
342 UTAH LAW REVIEW [NO. 2 
sampling of representative case studies from today’s potpourri of policies for the 
promotion of solar, wind, and other renewables. Application of a uniform rating 
scale across case studies is intended to allow policymakers to compare the relative 
equity of competing options in the clean energy policy toolbox. These ratings offer 
the basis for policy-specific reform suggestions to improve equity outcomes and 
guide policymakers toward a more equitable, next generation of clean energy 
policies. 
As the project of decarbonization and its enabling policies continue to evolve, 
equity will likely remain a moving target for policymakers. It is imperative, 
therefore, that equity inquiries become part of the policymaking process, rather than 
to be voiced post hoc by scholars and other outside critics. As regulators, utilities, 
and ratepayers move toward an increasingly interactive grid powered by 
renewables,27 the process that produces its enabling policies and regulations must 
also become more participatory. This Article suggests a modified version of Elinor 
Ostrom’s Nobel prize-winning framework for polycentric governance as a model to 
facilitate greater public participation—to produce a next generation of clean energy 
policies that more transparently balances and reconciles efficacy, efficiency, and 
equity considerations. 
This Article proceeds in four parts. Part I makes the case for including equity 
as a first-order consideration in clean energy policy design and implementation. 
Part II gives a brief overview of the principal policies to promote clean energy 
technologies in place today. Part III evaluates the equity of a sampling of case studies 
that represent the current generation of clean energy policies and offers suggestions 
for reform. Merging substance with process, Part IV draws on Elinor Ostrom’s 
polycentric governance models to propose a more participatory policymaking 
process that ensures greater consideration of equity concerns going forward. 
 
I.  THE CASE FOR EQUITY CONSIDERATIONS IN CLEAN ENERGY POLICY 
 
To better understand the importance of equity considerations in clean energy 
policy, this Part begins by surveying equity’s historic role in energy law (infra 
Section I.A.), before making the case for greater focus on the equity of policy 
pathways toward deep decarbonization beyond the literature’s current preoccupation 
with an outcome-oriented investigation of the social implications of a deeply 
decarbonized energy economy (infra Section I.B.). Part I closes by exploring the 
proper place of equity in clean energy policymaking, alongside efficacy, efficiency, 
and other top-level policy considerations (infra Section I.C). 
  
                                                   
27 See Welton, Clean Electrification, supra note 17, at 584–85 (describing initiatives to 
foster greater consumer participation in the electric grid). 
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A.  Equity’s Historic Role in Energy Law 
 
Equity, or the notion of matching costs with benefits as the term is used in this 
Article, has long been a staple of energy law and regulation in the United States. As 
early as in the 1890s, electricity pioneer Samuel Insull used the Wright meter, a 
novel device that, much like today’s “smart meters,” could record a customer’s 
overall electricity consumption as well as the timing and maximum level of her 
demand, to revolutionize the rate design for electric power.28 The meter’s detailed 
data allowed Insull to replace the traditional flat rate for electricity with a two-tiered 
rate structure.29 This new rate design used the customer’s overall consumption to 
determine her share of the utility’s operating expenses, while her peak demand 
represented the customer’s share in the utility’s capital investment to provide 
sufficient generating capacity.30 In equity terms, this two-tiered rate structure 
matched a customer’s benefits from electrical service to the costs the utility incurred 
to provide that service.31 Natural gas pipeline rates reflect a similar commitment to 
equity, with firm customers required to pay both a demand charge representing their 
peak demand and a usage charge for their overall consumption, while customers who 
agree to have their service interrupted in the event of a shortage only pay the usage 
charge.32 
The allocation of costs for new transmission infrastructure offers another, more 
recent example of energy law’s enduring commitment to equity. In 2011, the Federal 
Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) adopted Order 1000 in part to prevent free 
ridership by those who benefit from new transmission projects without sharing in 
their cost.33 To this end, FERC adopted a set of cost allocation principles requiring 
that “all regional and interregional cost allocation methods allocate costs for new 
transmission facilities in a manner that is at least roughly commensurate with the 
benefits received by those who will pay those costs.”34 The language used by FERC 
in Order 1000 is not novel but, rather, reflects energy law’s well-established “cost 
                                                   
28 See HAROLD L. PLATT, THE ELECTRIC CITY: ENERGY AND THE GROWTH OF THE 
CHICAGO AREA, 1880–1930, at 141–42 (1991). 
29 Id. at 126. 
30 Id. at 139–42. 
31 This type of matching has since become a staple of electricity rate regulation. See, 
e.g., Alabama Elec. Co-op., Inc. v. FERC, 684 F.2d 20, 27 (D.C. Cir. 1982) (“Properly 
designed rates should produce revenues from each class of customers which match, as 
closely as practicable, the costs to serve each class or individual customer.”) (emphasis 
omitted) (internal quotation omitted). 
32 In the wake of restructuring, federal regulations prohibit interstate natural gas 
pipelines from charging customers with interruptible service with a demand or reservation 
fee. See 18 C.F.R. § 284.9(c); see also Paladin Assocs., Inc. v. Montana Power Co., 97 F. 
Supp. 2d 1013, 1019 (D. Mont. 2000) (describing the mechanics of firm and interruptible 
natural gas service). 
33 See Transmission Planning & Cost Allocation by Transmission Owning & Operating 
Public Utilities, 18 C.F.R. 35, 136 FERC ¶ 61051 (July 21, 2011).  
34 Id.; see also Illinois Commerce Comm’n v. FERC, 721 F.3d 764, 770 (7th Cir. 2013) 
(offering an illustrative example of such cost-benefit matching). 
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causation” principle. Anchored in the Federal Power Act’s requirement that rates be 
“just and reasonable,”35 cost causation requires that rates reflect the costs actually 
caused by the customer who must pay them.36 In a near-perfect reprise of the 
economics literature’s definition of equity, courts assess compliance with the cost 
causation principle “by comparing the costs assessed against a party to the burdens 
imposed or benefits drawn by that party.”37 
 Some commentators view energy law’s reliance on the cost causation principle 
as an (over)emphasis of efficiency at the possible expense of equity.38 Critics 
bemoan that causal allocation of costs creates a barrier to access for lower-income 
consumers whose electricity and natural gas rates should be discounted.39 
Notwithstanding their merit in ensuring widespread access to affordable energy, rate 
discounts and rebates for lower-income households do not fall within the purview 
of equity as that term is defined in the economics literature and used here.40 To 
characterize the cost causation principle as running counter to equity objectives 
confuses equity with more normative concepts such as distributional fairness or 
social sustainability.41  
 
B.  Policy Equity Before Outcome Equity  
 
Notwithstanding the robust body of scholarship on the role of fairness in law 
generally,42 legal scholars are only just beginning to explore the appropriate role, if 
                                                   
35 16 U.S.C. § 824d(a); see also 15 U.S.C. § 717c(a) (discussing the regulation of 
natural gas rates). 
36 See, e.g., KN Energy, Inc. v. FERC, 968 F.2d 1295, 1300 (D.C. Cir. 1992); 
Transmission Access Policy Study Group v. FERC, 225 F.3d 667, 708 (D.C. Cir. 2000); 
Pacific Gas & Elec. Co. v. FERC, 373 F.3d 1315, 1320–21 (D.C. Cir. 2004). 
37 Illinois Commerce Comm’n v. FERC, 576 F.3d 470, 476 (7th Cir. 2009) (citing 
Midwest ISO Transmission Owners v. FERC, 373 F.3d 1361, 1368 (D.C. Cir. 2004)); see 
also William Boyd, Just Price, Public Utility, and the Long History of Economic Regulation 
in America, 35 YALE J. ON REG. 721, 727 (2018) (noting “reciprocity . . . in exchange” as a 
core element of the public utility idea). 
38 See, e.g., Welton, Clean Electrification, supra note 17, at 609–10 (noting that 
“scholars have long portrayed the field of public utility law as a protracted ideological battle 
between ‘equity’ on the one hand and ‘efficiency’ on the other”). 
39 Id. at 610. 
40 See supra note 18 and accompanying text. 
41 For a snapshot of the burgeoning literature on social sustainability, see, e.g., Thomas 
M. Parris & Robert W. Kates, Characterizing and Measuring Sustainable Development, 28 
ANN. REV. OF ENV’T & RES. 559, 561 (2003) (noting the importance of equal opportunity for 
the taxonomy of sustainable development); G. Assefa & B. Frostell, Social Sustainability 
and Social Acceptance in Technology Assessment: A Case Study of Energy Technologies, 29 
TECH. SOC’Y 63, 65 (2007) (highlighting the role of “fairness in distribution and opportunity” 
for socially sustainable systems); see also Mormann, supra note 12 (offering a framework 
of proxy criteria to assess the social sustainability of clean energy policies). 
42 See, e.g., FAIRNESS IN LAW AND ECONOMICS (Lee Anne Fennell & Richard H. 
McAdams eds., 2013) (featuring a collection of scholarly articles on fairness). 
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any, for concepts such as fairness and equity in renewable energy policy. In a recent 
article,43 Professor Troy Rule has posed the critical question to which extent, if any, 
fairness considerations should drive energy policy.44 He finds that the multitude of 
competing definitions renders fairness a potentially elusive goal to pursue as 
stakeholders frequently differ in their views of what would constitute a fair 
outcome.45 Rule concludes that polarizing fairness rhetoric in the clean energy 
discourse is unlikely to produce the policy landscape that will create a sustainable 
energy future.46  
Replacing the “notoriously fuzzy”47 concept of fairness with a less normatively 
defined notion of equity (closer to this Article’s working definition), Professor 
Shelley Welton has probed into the social implications of a participatory electric 
grid that encourages ratepayers to make behavioral changes and adopt innovative 
technologies in order to keep electricity affordable.48 She argues that ongoing 
debates over the distributional impacts of clean energy should be resolved through 
a renewed focus on electricity law’s original commitment to facilitating widespread 
access to affordable power.49 While Professors Rule and Welton differ in the precise 
metric by which to judge the social implications of clean energy (fairness vs. equity), 
both their inquiries share a focus on the ultimate policy outcomes, framed in terms 
of a sustainable energy future and access to affordable clean electricity, respectively.  
This Article seeks to expand the discourse by focusing not only on the equity 
(or fairness) of an eventual policy outcome but, critically, also on the equity of the 
policy measures adopted in pursuit of said outcome. The global potpourri of policies 
to promote clean, renewable energy offers ample evidence of how different policy 
pathways can lead to the same outcome. As these policies seek to leverage trillions 
of dollars50 for clean energy investment, they inevitably impact income and wealth 
distribution among the affected citizenry.51 Pareto optimality in the sense of making 
everyone better off and no one worse off is beyond the reach of virtually all law and 
policy.52 The importance of outcome equity as the focus of recent scholarship is 
undisputed. This Article posits that policy equity, that is, the commensurate 
                                                   
43 See Rule, supra note 17, at 116 (“This basic question underlies much of the current 
debate over the net metering programs and related policies . . . .”). 
44 See infra Section II.C. 
45 See Rule, supra note 17, at 127. 
46 Id. at 148; see also Outka, supra note 17, at 810 (observing that “competing 
conceptions of fairness in the distributed solar context are widely divergent”). 
47 See supra note 19 and accompanying text. 
48 See Welton, Clean Electrification, supra note 17, at 585 (offering examples of what 
a participatory grid could look like).  
49 Id. at 649. 
50 See, e.g., INT’L ENERGY AGENCY, WORLD ENERGY OUTLOOK 21 (2016) (“An 
increasing slice of the roughly $1.8 trillion of investment each year in the energy sector has 
been attracted to clean energy . . . .”). 
51 See, e.g., Guido Calabresi, The Pointlessness of Pareto: Carrying Coase Further, 
100 YALE L.J. 1211, 1214 (1991). 
52 Richard J. Lazarus, Pursuing “Environmental Justice”: The Distributional Effects of 
Environmental Protection, 87 NW. U. L. REV. 787, 792–93 (1993). 
346 UTAH LAW REVIEW [NO. 2 
distribution of costs and benefits a policy creates along the path to said outcome, 
logically comes first. The case for policy equity is especially strong in the context 
of a task as Herculean in scope as decarbonization, with policy timelines measured 
in decades rather than years. Policymakers and scholars alike would do well, 
therefore, to include both outcome and policy equity considerations as they design 
and implement the next generation of clean energy policies. 
 
C.  The Proper Role for Equity in Clean Energy Policy 
 
Equity does not operate in a vacuum. It is but one of many aspects for 
policymakers to consider as they craft clean energy policies, chief among them the 
current staples of policy design and analysis—efficacy and efficiency. In a policy 
equation with three variables “e,” how do you know which “e” to solve for? This 
conundrum is further complicated by the fact that efficacy, efficiency, and equity all 
interact in a variety of ways.53  
Consider the fundamental requirement that a policy must produce some, 
however minimal, deployment of clean energy technology to create the empirical 
evidence necessary to properly assess its efficiency. Simple as this may sound, not 
every policy passes the basic efficacy test. The city of Palo Alto’s 2012 solar feed-
in tariff, for example, failed to incentivize any deployment during the first three 
years of its existence.54 An equity inquiry may help explain the policy’s lack of 
efficacy, perhaps as the result of targeting too few potential developers and other 
economic beneficiaries. At the other end of the efficacy spectrum, a policy that 
delivers significantly higher-than-expected deployment may offer overly generous 
incentives, raising concerns over windfall benefits for developers and, ultimately, 
the policy’s cost efficiency. Oregon’s Solar Photovoltaic Volumetric Incentive 
Program55 illustrates this dynamic. Initial rates of up to $0.65 per kilowatt-hour of 
solar electricity led to substantial oversubscription of early deployment rounds 
prompting widespread criticism of the program as wasteful and inefficient.56 
Efficiency and equity have a similarly complex relationship. The scholarly 
literature has long debated the tension between equity and efficiency in energy law.57 
                                                   
53 Making a similar point, albeit in the broader context of sustainable development, see 
J.B. Ruhl, Sustainable Development: A Five-Dimensional Algorithm for Environmental Law, 
18 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 31, 31 (1999) (“Environment, economy, and social equity are not 
mutually exclusive, hermetically sealed spheres of life.”). 
54 See Mormann, Clean Energy Federalism, supra note 14, at 1661. 
55 See OR. PUB. UTIL. COMM’N, SOLAR PHOTOVOLTAIC VOLUMETRIC INCENTIVE 
PROGRAM: REPORT TO THE LEGISLATIVE ASSEMBLY 2–3 (2013).  
56 See, e.g., OR. PUB. UTIL. COMM’N, UM 1505, SOLAR PHOTOVOLTAIC COMMENTS 
AND REGULATIONS 3 (2011) (statement of Dave Sullivan) (“The incentive rates were at least 
30 percent too high . . . .”). 
57 See, e.g., Welton, supra note 17, at 609–10 (“scholars have long portrayed the field 
of public utility law as a protracted ideological battle between ‘equity,’ on the one hand, and 
‘efficiency,’ on the other”); Richard A. Posner, Taxation by Regulation, 2 BELL J. ECON. & 
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In reality, both may but need not necessarily pull in opposite directions. In some 
instances, equity improvements may produce sizeable gains in policy efficiency, as 
demonstrated by the American Recovery and Reconstruction Act’s impact on U.S. 
wind power development. When the Act’s § 1603 grant temporarily allowed clean 
energy developers to choose a direct cash subsidy in lieu of their traditional tax 
credits,58 the pool of direct economic beneficiaries increased dramatically beyond 
the small group of banks and highly profitable corporations able to monetize tax 
credits in a timely fashion.59 Remarkably, these gains in policy equity resulted in a 
100% increase in policy efficiency.60 Figure 2 illustrates the intricate connections 
and interactions among policy efficacy, efficiency, and equity. 
 
 
 
Figure 2: Interconnectedness Among Policy Efficacy, Efficiency, and Equity 
  
                                                   
MGMT. SCI. 22, 44 (1971); EDWARD E. ZAJAC, FAIRNESS OR EFFICIENCY: AN INTRODUCTION 
TO PUBLIC UTILITY PRICING (1978). 
58 See Pub. L. No. 111-5, 123 Stat. 115.  
59 For a discussion of the challenges in monetizing federal tax incentives and their 
implications for policy equity, see infra Section III.D. 
60 See Ethan Zindler & Tyler Tringas, Cash Is King: Shortcomings of US Tax Credits 
in Subsidizing Renewables, BLOOMBERG NEW ENERGY FIN. 1 (2009) (“One dollar in cash 
has, on average, gone twice as far as one dollar of tax credits in subsidizing wind.”); 
Mormann, Beyond Tax Credits, supra note 18, at 319–23 (comparing the policy efficiency 
of federal tax credits and cash subsidies for wind energy deployment). 
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In light of the above, it is easy to see why equity should not be misconstrued as 
the trump card in the clean energy policy deck. Rather, it is one consideration among 
many for policymakers to balance in a multi-factorial framework. And there may 
well be instances where deviations from equity’s tenet of a commensurate 
distribution of costs and benefits are called for, for example in the interest of 
universal access to electric service. One such instance is reflected in the “lifeline 
rates” encouraged by the 1978 Public Utility Regulatory Policies Act to meet the 
essential needs of low-income residential consumers by offering electricity at rates 
below the utility’s actual cost.61 The cross-subsidization inherent in these and other 
discount energy programs for low-income households results in an uneven 
distribution of economic benefits and costs. But that distortionary effect should not 
a priori eliminate them from the public policy toolbox. After all, cross-subsidies can 
serve efficiency as well as other important social goals.62 This Article’s equity lens 
helps draw attention to cross-subsidies and other mismatches between the allocation 
of costs and benefits in order to facilitate the public scrutiny necessary to ensure that 
they are, in fact, used in furtherance of important public policy objectives, and not 
for hand-outs to special interest groups or pork barreling.63 
 
II.  CLEAN ENERGY POLICY TODAY: AN OVERVIEW 
 
Policies to promote solar, wind, and other renewable energy technologies can 
take a variety of forms. Economists have long suggested that pricing greenhouse gas 
emissions, in the form of a carbon tax64 or cap-and-trade regime,65 is, in theory at 
least, the single most efficient policy to mitigate climate change and promote 
abatement technologies, such as solar, wind, and other low-carbon renewables.66 A 
price on greenhouse gas emissions would require producers to internalize the cost 
of their emissions and thereby penalize pollution and encourage abatement. Over 
time, this direct, static effect would be complemented by an indirect, dynamic effect 
of encouraging the refinement of existing and development of new abatement 
                                                   
61 See 16 U.S.C. § 2624. For a review of electricity rate discount programs in the United 
States, see STEVEN FERREY, THE LAW OF INDEPENDENT POWER § 10:17 (2018). 
62 See Rule, supra note 17, at 131, 133. 
63 See, e.g., CHARLES WEISS & WILLIAM B. BONVILLIAN, STRUCTURING AN ENERGY 
TECHNOLOGY REVOLUTION 208 (2009) (noting the risk of pork barreling inherent in energy 
policy incentive programs). 
64 See, e.g., Gilbert E. Metcalf & David Weisbach, The Design of a Carbon Tax, 33 
HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 499 (2009). 
65 See, e.g., Ann E. Carlson, Designing Effective Climate Policy: Cap-and-Trade and 
Complimentary Policies, 49 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 207 (2012). 
66 See, e.g., NICHOLAS STERN, THE ECONOMICS OF CLIMATE CHANGE 348 (2007); 
Dominique Finon, Pros and Cons of Alternative Policies Aimed at Promoting Renewables, 
12 EIB PAPERS 110, 112 (2007); Adam B. Jaffe et al., A Tale of Two Market Failures: 
Technology and Environmental Policy, 54 ECOLOGICAL ECON. 164, 165, 169 (2005); Atanas 
Kolev & Armin Riess, Environmental and Technology Externalities: Policy and Investment 
Implications, 12 EIB PAPERS 134, 140 (2007). 
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technologies.67 From an efficiency perspective, a tax on greenhouse gas emissions 
or a cap-and-trade scheme would incur lower opportunity costs than direct public 
policy support for specific clean energy technologies.68 Notwithstanding its 
theoretical appeal, the adoption of a nationwide or, better yet, global policy regime 
that accurately prices the societal cost of greenhouse gas emissions is politically 
unlikely in the near-to-medium term.69 Accordingly, this Article focuses its equity 
inquiry on policies directly aimed at promoting the large-scale deployment of solar, 
wind, and other renewables. 
Around the world, feed-in tariffs (infra Section II.A.) dominate the clean energy 
policy landscape, followed by tender regimes (infra Section II.B.) and net energy 
metering programs (infra Section II.C.).70 In the United States, federal policy 
support for renewables comes primarily in the form of tax credits71 
(infra Section II.D.) while twenty-nine states, three territories, and the District of 
Columbia have adopted renewable portfolio standards (infra Section II.E.) to 
promote solar, wind, and other renewables.72 
 
A.  Feed-in Tariffs 
 
Feed-in tariffs are two-pronged policy instruments for the promotion of 
renewables deployment.73 The “feed-in” prong guarantees renewable power 
generators access to their local power grid in order to ensure viable sales and 
                                                   
67 See Kolev & Riess, supra note 66, at 137 (discussing the impact of environmental 
policy on technological change). 
68 See Felix Mormann, Requirements for a Renewables Revolution, 38 ECOLOGY L.Q. 
901, 929 (2011) [hereinafter Mormann, Renewables Revolution].  
69 For issues related to the political economy of emission pricing, see id. at 930–32. For 
evidence of the failed campaigns for a federal cap-and-trade regime, see S. 1733, 111th 
Cong. (2010) and H.R. 2454, 111th Cong. (2009). See also Gary Lucas, Jr., Voter Psychology 
and the Carbon Tax, 90 TEMPLE L. REV. 1 (2017) (discussing how a variety of biases and 
heuristics influence the electorate’s perception of carbon taxation). 
70 See REN21 2015, supra note 4, at 89 (listing nearly eighty countries with feed-in 
tariffs, sixty with tender regimes, and close to fifty with net energy metering programs). 
71 See Mormann, Beyond Tax Credits, supra note 18, at 311–17, 319–23 (describing 
and critiquing federal tax credit support for renewable energy in the United States).  
72 See N.C. CLEAN ENERGY TECH. CTR., RENEWABLE PORTFOLIO STANDARD POLICIES 
1 (2017), http://ncsolarcen-prod.s3.amazonaws.com/wp-content/uploads/2014/11/Renew 
able-Portfolio-Standards.pdf [https://perma.cc/J2TQ-VVTF]. Eight more states and one U.S. 
territory have adopted nonbinding goals for the deployment of renewables. See id. For a 
discussion of the history and political background of state renewable portfolio standards, see 
Barry Rabe, Race to the Top: The Expanding Role of U.S. State Renewable Portfolio 
Standards, 7 SUSTAINABLE DEV. L. & POL’Y 10, 10 (2007).  
73 Wilson H. Rickerson et al., If the Shoe FITs: Using Feed-in Tariffs to Meet U.S. 
Renewable Electricity Targets, 20 THE ELECTRICITY J. 73, 73 (2007). For a detailed 
description of the various feed-in tariff design elements, see MIGUEL MENDONÇA ET AL., 
POWERING THE GREEN ECONOMY – THE FEED-IN TARIFF HANDBOOK 15–16 (2010).  
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distribution channels for their electricity.74 The “tariff” prong requires local electric 
utilities to purchase the power output of these generators at above-market rates that 
are designed to cover the generator’s cost and offer a reasonable return on 
investment.75 These rates can be set as a fixed total price for electricity from 
renewables, a premium to be paid in addition to the market price, or a percentage of 
retail rates.76 While renewable portfolio standards let the market determine trading 
prices for renewable energy credits and, hence, the overall value of renewable 
electricity, feed-in tariffs require regulators to set tariff rates at a level that is high 
enough to effectively incentivize investment in renewable power generation without 
offering windfall profits.77 Like portfolio standards, feed-in tariffs pass the costs of 
premium payments for renewable energy onto ratepayers.78 Feed-in tariffs are 
usually technology-specific, offering different tariff rates for different strands of 
renewable energy technologies based on their respective technological maturity and 
generation costs.79 In addition, feed-in tariff design can be size-sensitive so as to 
account for the different cost structures of utility-scale and distributed generation.80 
Historically, feed-in tariffs have been particularly popular in European countries 
such as Denmark, Germany, Portugal, and Spain.81 Recent U.S. adopters of feed-in 
                                                   
74 Rickerson et al., supra note 73, at 1.  
75 The first-ever feed-in tariff in the United States, implemented with great success by 
the municipality of Gainesville, Florida, was designed to offer a return on investment of five 
to six percent. See KARLYNN CORY ET AL., NAT’L RENEWABLE ENERGY LAB., FEED-IN 
TARIFF POLICY: DESIGN, IMPLEMENTATION, AND RPS POLICY INTERACTIONS (2009), 
https://www.nrel.gov/docs/fy09osti/45549.pdf [https://perma.cc/N3MP-PMNK]. The 
duration of the utility’s purchase obligation under a feed-in tariff ranges from 8 years in 
Spain to 15 years in France to 20 years in Germany. See Finon, supra note 66, at 115. 
76 The second option is sometimes referred to as a “feed-in premium” or “premium 
feed-in tariff.” See MENDONÇA ET AL., supra note 73, at 40. For an example of the retail rate 
percentage option. See Butler & Neuhoff, supra note 15, at 1855. Unless expressly stated 
otherwise, this Article refers to all of these options uniformly as feed-in tariffs. 
77 MENDONÇA ET AL., supra note 73, at 19. 
78 Id. at 29. 
79 Id. For an example of cost reductions through technology learning in solar 
photovoltaics and onshore wind energy, see IPCC, RENEWABLE ENERGY SOURCES, supra 
note 2. 
80 MENDONÇA ET AL., supra note 73, at 27. 
81 See IEA 2008, supra note 15, at 94. For further background, see David Grinlinton & 
LeRoy Paddock, The Role of Feed-in Tariffs in Supporting the Expansion of Solar Energy 
Production, 41 U. TOL. L. REV. 943, 949 (2010). More recently, many jurisdictions outside 
of Europe have adopted FITs to promote renewable energy, including the Canadian province 
of Ontario, South Africa, Kenya, the Indian states West Bengal, Rajasthan, Gujarat, and 
Punjab, as well as Australia’s Capital Territory, New South Wales, and South Australia. See 
MENDONÇA ET AL., supra note 73, at 77. 
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tariff programs to promote renewables include California,82 Hawaii,83 Maine,84 
Oregon,85 Rhode Island,86 Vermont,87 and Washington.88 
 
B.  Tender Regimes 
 
Under a tender regime—sometimes described as a reverse auction 
mechanism89—the government invites competitive bids to supply a specified 
amount of electricity from a certain renewable energy technology over a pre-
determined period of time.90 The successful bidder is awarded a long-term power 
purchase contract at its winning bid’s price per kilowatt hour (kWh). The additional 
cost, i.e., the winning bid’s premium over the market rate of electricity, is usually 
recovered through a levy or system benefits charge that is distributed across all 
ratepayers.91 Tender regimes are inherently technology-specific, as the call for bids 
specifies the eligible strand of renewable energy technologies.92 
China, France, Ireland, the United Kingdom, and some states in the United 
States have used tender regimes to promote the deployment of various renewable 
                                                   
82 See S.B. 32, 2007-2008 Sess. (Cal. 2008). 
83 See HAW. PUB. UTIL. COMM’N, DECISIONS AND ORDERS, DOCKET 2008-0273, 
(2008). 
84 See An Act to Establish the Renewable Energy Feed-in Tariff, S.P. 367, 126th Leg., 
(Me. 2013). 
85 See H.B. 3039, 75th Gen. Assemb. Reg. Sess. (Or. 2009); H.B. 3690, 75th Leg. Spec. 
Sess. (Or. 2010). 
86 See H.B. 6104 (R.I. 2011).  
87 See Public Act No. 45, Bien. Sess. (Vt. 2009); Public Act No. 170, Adj. Sess. (Vt. 
2012). 
88 See, e.g., S.B. 5101, 66th Leg. Reg. Sess. (Wash. 2005); S.B. 6170, 61st Leg. Reg. 
Sess. (Wash. 2009); S.B. 6658, 61st Leg. Reg. Sess. (Wash. 2010). 
89 See Christian Jaag & Urs Trinkner, Tendering Universal Service Obligations in 
Liberalized Network Industries, 10 COMPETITION & REG. NETWORK INDUSTRIES 314 (2009), 
http://www.swiss-economics.ch/RePEc/files/0013JaagTrinkner.pdf [https://perma.cc/2LBA 
-KEJ6] (providing an introduction to the terminology and mechanics of tender regimes / 
reverse auction mechanisms in liberalized markets). 
90 See Claus Huber et al., Economic Modelling of Price Support Mechanisms for 
Renewable Energy: Case Study on Ireland, 35 ENERGY POL’Y 1172 (2007); IEA 2008, supra 
note 15, at 92 (providing further information on tender regimes in the renewable electricity 
context).  
91 Robert Gross & Phil Heptonstall, Time to Stop Experimenting with UK Renewable 
Energy Policy 8 (Imperial Coll. Ctr. for Energy Policy and Tech., Working Paper No. 
ICEPT/WP/2010/003, 2010), http://www.biee.org/wpcms/wp-content/uploads/Time_to_ 
stop_experimenting_with_UK_renewable_energy_policy_2010_pap.pdf [https://perma.cc/ 
S35X-XKHR]. 
92 See MENDONÇA ET AL., supra note 73, at 174–75. 
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energy technologies.93 Denmark, too, has recently relied on tender regimes for 
offshore wind farms.94 
 
C.  Net Energy Metering Programs 
 
Net energy metering has evolved into the primary mechanism for tracking and 
rewarding distributed renewable energy generation in the United States.95 Following 
the policy’s early adoption by Idaho, Arizona, and Massachusetts back in the 1980s, 
net metering has since proliferated to over forty states.96 Notwithstanding some 
variation across programs, net energy metering generally allows an electric utility’s 
customer to run her meter forward while consuming power from the grid and 
backward while feeding power into the grid, e.g., from solar panels on her rooftop.97 
At the end of the billing period, the utility charges the customer for the amount of 
power consumed from the grid minus power generated on-site and fed into the grid.98 
So long as the customer-generator, on balance, consumes more electricity from the 
grid than she feeds in, her locally generated power is effectively remunerated at the 
retail electricity rate.99 
 
D.  Tax Credits 
 
For more than two decades, tax incentives have been the federal policy of 
choice to promote the deployment of renewable energy technologies.100 These tax 
breaks come primarily in the form of two distinct instruments—accelerated 
                                                   
93 See, e.g., Bent Ole Gram Mortenson, International Experiences of Wind Energy, 2 
ENVTL. & ENERGY L. & POL’Y J. 179, 201 (2008); Reinhard Haas et al., A Historical Review 
of Promotion Strategies for Electricity from Renewable Energy Sources in EU Countries, 15 
RENEWABLE & SUSTAINABLE ENERGY RES. 1003, 1020 (2011); MENDONÇA ET AL., supra 
note 73, at 174–75. 
94 Haas et al., supra note 16, at 1020. 
95 See  REN21 2015, supra note 4, at 89; see also U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., U.S. 
DEP’T ENERGY, DIRECT FED. FIN. INTERVENTIONS & SUBSIDIES IN ENERGY IN FISCAL YEAR 
2013 (2015), https://www.eia.gov/analysis/requests/subsidy/archive/2013/pdf/subsidy.pdf. 
96 See Richard L. Revesz & Burcin Unel, Managing the Future of the Electricity Grid: 
Distributed Generation and Net Metering, 41 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 43, 47, 59 (2017). 
97 See, e.g., EDISON ELEC. INST., STRAIGHT TALK ABOUT NET METERING 1–2 (2013). 
98 See, e.g., Steven Ferrey, Solving the Multimillion Dollar Constitutional Puzzle 
Surrounding State “Sustainable” Energy Policy, 49 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 121, 128–29 
(2014).  
99 See, e.g., NAIM R. DARGHOUTH ET AL., LAWRENCE BERKELEY NAT’L LAB., NET 
METERING AND MARKET FEEDBACK LOOPS: EXPLORING THE IMPACT OF RETAIL RATE 
DESIGN ON DISTRIBUTED PV DEPLOYMENT 1 (2015), http://emp.lbl.gov/sites/all/files/lbnl-
183185_0.pdf [https://perma.cc/Q43S-QDPW]. 
100 See Mark Bolinger et al., Preliminary Evaluation of the Section 1603 Treasury 
Grant Program for Renewable Power Projects in the United States, 38 ENERGY POL’Y 6804 
(2010). 
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depreciation rates101 and tax credits.102 From an economic perspective, tax credits 
tend to be of relatively greater importance to renewable energy deployment than 
accelerated depreciation.103 Accordingly, this Article focuses on tax credits. Federal 
tax policy seeks to promote the deployment of renewable energy technologies 
through two types of credits. Production tax credits reward the generation of 
electricity from renewable sources by awarding eligible facilities tax credits in 
proportion to the quantity of electricity they produce and feed into the grid.104 
Investment tax credits honor capital expenditures in equipment for renewable power 
generation by awarding eligible projects tax credits equal to a percentage of their 
qualifying investment costs.105 The Consolidated Appropriations Act of 2016 
recently extended tax credits for solar and wind by another five years.106 
 
E.  Renewable Portfolio Standards 
 
A renewable portfolio standard, also known as a renewable target or quota 
obligation, requires electric utility companies to source a certain share of the 
electricity they sell to end-users from renewable sources of energy.107 Utilities prove 
their compliance with these requirements through “renewable energy credits” 
(RECs).108 Power plant operators normally receive one such credit for every 
megawatt hour (MWh) of electricity generated from renewable resources.109 Non-
utility power generators can sell their renewable energy credits to utilities in order 
to receive a premium on top of their income from power sales in the wholesale 
electricity market. Utilities subject to a renewable portfolio standard’s sourcing 
requirements can also invest in their own renewable power generation facilities to 
earn renewable energy credits for the electricity they produce. Whether utilities 
choose to earn their own credits or purchase them from others, they eventually pass 
                                                   
101 See generally Tax Reform Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-514, 100 Stat. 2085 (1986). 
(creating the accelerated depreciation rates that renewable energy assets enjoy today). 
102 See generally Energy Policy Act of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-486, 106 Stat. 2776 
(1992) (creating the first Federal tax credits for renewable energy for wind power).  
103 See Chadbourne & Parke LLP, State of the Tax Equity Market, PROJECT FINANCE 
NEWSWIRE 28, 29 (2012). In fact, one industry insider has stated that “[m]any tax equity 
investors have turned their noses up at the bonus [depreciation rates].” Id. at 33. 
104 See 26 U.S.C. § 45 (2018). 
105 See 26 U.S.C. § 48 (2018). 
106 See Felix Mormann, Fading into the Sunset: Solar and Wind Get Five More Years 
of Tax Credits with a Phase-Down, 47 ABA TRENDS 9, 9–10 (2016). 
107 For details, see Haas et al., supra note 16, at 1011–12; MENDONÇA ET AL., supra 
note 73, at 150–51. 
108 MENDONÇA ET AL., supra note 73, at 161. Internationally, renewable energy credits 
are also referred to as Tradable Green Certificates or Renewable Energy Guarantees of 
Origin. Id. at 155.  
109 See Lincoln L. Davies, Power Forward: The Argument for a National RPS, 42 
CONN. L. REV. 1339, 1359, 1378 (2010) (reporting that some states award RECs for every 
kWh of renewable electricity generation). 
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the associated costs on to their ratepayers.110 Many portfolio standards are 
technology-neutral and award the same amount of credits for all eligible renewable 
energy technologies. More and more jurisdictions, however, implement technology-
specific renewable portfolio standards, that offer carve-outs or credit multipliers for 
select renewable energy technologies and projects based on size and location.111 In 
1983, Iowa became the first state in the union to adopt a renewable portfolio 
standard.112 Today, twenty-nine states, the District of Columbia, and three U.S. 
territories have adopted portfolio standards to promote the large-scale deployment 
of renewable energy technologies.113 International adopters of renewable portfolio 
standard policies include Australia, Belgium, Sweden, and the United Kingdom.114 
 
III.  ASSESSING THE EQUITY OF TODAY’S CLEAN ENERGY POLICIES 
 
This Part explores the policy equity of a representative sampling of clean 
energy policies in place today. The costs and benefits generated under a policy vary 
in terms of the immediacy and saliency of their accrual. The monetary incentives 
offered and the taxes or charges imposed to fund them represent the type of benefits 
and costs that are relatively easy to attribute to a specific clean energy policy. In 
addition to these direct costs and benefits, the following inquiry also considers a 
policy’s more indirect impacts on participants in the respective energy economy, 
such as the burden on ratepayers to fund balancing services for intermittent 
renewables or wholesale market price reductions resulting from the displacement of 
less efficient and more expensive peaker plants.115  
It is important to note that the present assessment is limited to select economic 
impacts and does not extend to a policy’s impact on greenhouse gas emissions, air 
pollution, or other environmental outcomes. The decision to exclude environmental 
costs and benefits from the scope of inquiry is motivated by two observations. First, 
assuming their effectiveness in facilitating the intended deployment of solar, wind 
and other clean energy technologies, all of the examined policies should yield similar 
                                                   
110 See id. at 1374. 
111 See Felix Mormann, Constitutional Challenges and Regulatory Opportunities for 
State Climate Policy Innovation, 41 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 189, 198 (2017) [hereinafter 
Mormann, State Climate Policy Innovation]. 
112 See Davies, supra note 109, at 1357. 
113 See N.C. CLEAN ENERGY TECH. CTR., RENEWABLE PORTFOLIO STANDARD POLICIES 
(2015), http://ncsolarcen-prod.s3.amazonaws.com/wp-content/uploads/2014/11/Renewable 
-Portfolio-Standards.pdf [https://perma.cc/J2TQ-VVTF]. Eight more states and one U.S. 
territory have adopted nonbinding goals for the deployment of renewables. Id. For a 
discussion of the history and political background of state renewable portfolio standards, see 
Barry Rabe, Race to the Top: The Expanding Role of U.S. State Renewable Portfolio 
Standards, 7 SUSTAINABLE DEV. L. & POL’Y 10 (2007).  
114 See MENDONÇA ET AL., supra note 73, at 151; IEA 2008, supra note 15, at 94–95.  
115 See also Revesz & Unel, supra note 96, at 78–79 (offering a similar taxonomy in 
their exploration of the impact of distributed generation on the “parties involved in the 
transactions that take place in the electricity market”). 
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environmental benefits.116 When controlling for variations in deployment efficacy, 
differences in net carbon reduction, air pollution abatement and other environmental 
outcomes are more likely attributable to the respective electricity market’s pre-
existing resource mix and other exogenous factors than to the underlying policy.117 
Second, most of the environmental benefits delivered by clean energy technologies 
and their enabling policies accrue at a regional, if not global level, with limited 
potential for appropriation and exclusion, raising fewer equity concerns than their 
economic counterparts.118  
As always, when evaluating and comparing policies, it is important to 
differentiate between general issues related to policy equity that arise from a policy’s 
conception and more particularized issues that result from the specific 
implementation of said policy. In a world without resource constraints (or word 
limits), increasing the sample size to ten or more case studies per policy might 
facilitate a better differentiation between concept- and implementation-related 
issues. A sampling of fifty-plus policies, however, would likely require sacrificing 
analytical depth for jurisdictional breadth. The following inquiry, therefore, is 
limited to one representative case study for each of today’s five most dominant clean 
energy policies. Unless otherwise indicated, any insights apply only to the policy as 
implemented in that particular case. The choice of case studies was based on the 
availability of pertinent data as well as the respective jurisdiction’s role as a thought 
leader and role model for the policy in question. 
To facilitate a better comparison across policies, policy equity is rated on a 
four-step scale ranging from poor to moderate to good to excellent, applied to the 
matching of direct and indirect costs and benefits, respectively. Table 1 illustrates 
this qualitative grading scale. 
 
Rating Policy Equity Characteristics 
Excellent Matching distribution of costs and benefits 
Good Substantial match in distribution of costs and benefits 
Moderate Partial match in distribution of costs and benefits 
Poor Severe mismatch in distribution of costs and benefits 
 
Table 1: Rating Scale and Criteria for Case Study Analysis 
                                                   
116 The same rationale motivates the exclusion of macro-economic benefits, such as job 
creation and tax revenue. For an international discussion of the employment effects of tax 
incentives, feed-in tariffs, and renewable portfolio standards, among other policies, see 
Mormann et al., supra note 8, at 74–76 (comparing job creation across California, Texas, 
and Germany); see also Welton & Eisen, supra note 17, at 28–35 (exploring the distribution 
of “green jobs”). 
117 Which policy delivers the greatest environmental bang for the ratepayers’ or 
taxpayers’ buck is a separate question, explored in detail, in the rich literature focused on the 
relative efficiency of clean energy policies. See supra note 15.  
118 See, e.g., Mormann, Clean Energy Federalism, supra note 14, at 1638–41 
(surveying the various environmental benefits associated with solar, wind, and other clean 
energy technologies as well as the scope of their accrual). 
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A.  Feed-in Tariffs – Case Study Germany 
 
Germany’s feed-in tariff experience has elicited a mixed response. Some praise 
the country’s “healthy” feed-in tariff and the resulting “proliferation of solar 
systems.”119 Others consider it “clear that the transformation, if plausible, will be 
wrenching”120 as “German families are being hit by rapidly increasing electricity 
rates.”121 This critique reflects concern over the social implications of Germany’s 
feed-in tariff implementation to promote solar, wind, and other low-carbon 
renewables. Based on this Article’s inquiry, the German feed-in tariff system scores 
moderately in overall terms of policy equity’s tenet of commensurately matching 
the program’s costs and benefits. 
On the positive side, the German feed-in tariff system creates direct economic 
opportunities open to a wide swath of the country’s population. Unlike competing 
policies,122 feed-in tariffs incur very low transaction costs thanks, in large part, to 
the local utility’s obligation to execute a power purchase agreement based on 
standard terms that guarantee the full tariff payment without the need for time-
consuming and, hence, costly negotiations. It is up to the local utility in cooperation 
with other network operators to recover the cost of the feed-in tariff from its 
ratepayers.123 In addition, Germany’s system of feed-in tariffs differentiates among 
a diverse portfolio of technologies, project sizes and sites to create a wide range of 
development opportunities. In total, the Renewable Energy Sources Law establishes 
some thirty different tariffs custom-tailored to address the needs of over ten distinct 
renewable energy technologies and applications while also accounting for 
differences in size, location, etc.124 The hair in Germany’s feed-in tariff soup, as far 
as access to its economic benefits is concerned, lies in the fact that, as a general 
matter, only owners of real property but no tenants can make use of the program’s 
financial incentives. 
The German feed-in tariff’s overall equity rating is brought down by its regime 
for allocating direct program costs. Critics of Germany’s Energiewende125 decry that 
                                                   
119 John Pang et al., Germany’s Energiewende, 152 PUB. UTIL. FORT. 14, 14 (2014). 
120 Justin Gillis, Sun and Wind Alter Global Landscape, Leaving Utilities Behind, N.Y. 
TIMES, Sept. 13, 2014, at A1.  
121 Melissa Eddy & Stanley Reed, Germany’s Effort at Clean Energy Proves Complex, 
N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 18, 2013, at A6; see also Matthew Karnitschnig, Germany’s Expensive 
Gamble on Renewable Energy, WALL ST. J. (Aug. 26, 2014), http://www.wsj.com/articles/ 
germanys-expensive-gamble-on-renewable-energy-1409106602 [https://perma.cc/69ZP-
53SS]. 
122 See infra Sections III.D–E. 
123 See  MENDONÇA ET AL., supra note 73, at xxii fig.0.1 (offering an instructive 
overview of the flow of payments under Germany’s feed-in tariff). 
124 See Erneuerbare-Energien-Gesetz [EEG] [Renewable Energies Act], July 21, 2014, 
§§ 40—51 (Ger.), http://www.gesetze-im-internet.de/bundesrecht/eeg_2014/ge-samt.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/5VCV-J4CX]. 
125 For an introduction to Germany’s ambitious energy policy, sometimes translated as 
“energy transition,” see FED. MINISTRY OF ECON. AND TECH., GERMANY’S NEW ENERGY 
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“German families are being hit by rapidly increasing electricity rates” and 
“[b]usinesses are more and more worried that their energy costs will put them at a 
disadvantage to competitors in nations with lower energy costs . . . .”126 These 
concerns are warranted insofar as the levy imposed on residential ratepayers to 
finance Germany’s commitment to renewables has steadily grown in recent years, 
accounting for eight cents per kWh or 24 percent of average residential retail rates 
in 2017.127 Overall, however, the feed-in tariff surcharge is only the second largest 
driver of residential power pricing, behind grid-related charges (26 percent) but 
ahead of energy procurement costs (19 percent) and applicable taxes (23 percent).128  
The main criticism to be leveled against Germany’s feed-in tariffs, from an 
equity perspective, is that the cost burden is not spread evenly among ratepayers. 
The Renewable Energy Sources Law exempts nearly 2,000 electricity-intensive 
industrial customers, such as large-scale chemical, steel, and paper industries, from 
part, if not all, of the feed-in tariff levy.129 When those who consume the most 
electricity contribute the least—if anything—to funding policies for the energy 
economy’s decarbonization, policy equity suffers due to the mismatch between 
widely available economic benefits but selectively borne costs.130 
Germany’s feed-in tariffs perform moderately as far as indirect program costs 
and benefits are concerned. On the positive side, the “merit-order effect” that 
determines the order in which network operators call on, or dispatch, available 
                                                   
POL’Y (2012), http://www.bmwi.de/English/Redaktion/Pdf/germanys-new-energy-policy 
[https://perma.cc/44PM-3JFF]. 
126 Eddy & Reed, supra note 121. 
127 See BUNDESVERBAND DER ENERGIE UND WASSERWIRTSCHAFT, ERNEUERBARE 
ENERGIEN UND DAS EEG: ZAHLEN, FAKTEN, GRAFIKEN 29 (2017), https://www.bdew.de/ 
media/documents/Awh_20170710_Erneuerbare-Energien-EEG_2017.pdf [https://perma. 
cc/P46T-XTMB] [hereinafter BDEW 2017]. 
128 Id. 
129 See BUNDESVERBAND DER ENERGIE UND WASSERWIRTSCHAFT, ERNEUERBARE 
ENERGIEN UND DAS EEG: ZAHLEN, FAKTEN, GRAFIKEN 51 (2014), https://www.bdew.de/ 
internet.nsf/id/bdew-publikation-erneuerbare-energien-und-das-eeg-zahlen-fakten-grafiken 
-2014-de/$file/Energie-Info_Erneuerbare% 20Energien%20und%20das%20EEG%202014 
_korr%2027.02.2014_final.pdf [https://perma.cc/K9JQ-C35K] [hereinafter BDEW 2014]; 
see also Mormann et al., supra note 8, at 73 (placing Germany’s electricity cost in 
international and macroeconomic context); BDEW 2017, supra note 127, at 33 (estimating 
that, in 2017, exempt industrial ratepayers consumed 140 TWh while paying only a fraction, 
if any, of the feed-in tariff levy). 
130 The German legislature’s decision to exempt major industrial players from funding 
the nation’s feed-in tariff is a good example of the multi-factorial decisionmaking process 
that policymakers have to engage in. From a social perspective, the exemption may have 
been viewed as the only way (short of border adjustments made difficult by the country’s 
E.U. membership) to ensure the domestic industry’s international competitiveness and, with 
it, local employment, tax revenue, and other economic benefits. This Article’s equity inquiry 
renders no judgment on the validity of such reasoning, simply seeks to draw attention to the 
resulting cross-subsidization to allow readers to form their own opinion. See also supra 
Section I.C. 
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generators,131 has allowed the growing share of renewable power generators to push 
older, higher-cost—and frequently higher-emitting—generators out of the market. 
Between 2008 and 2013, this indirect program benefit has helped to reduce 
wholesale electricity prices by over 50 percent.132  
On the negative side, the German policymaker has privileged renewables by 
exempting them from the forecast and balancing responsibilities of forward power 
markets.133 In these markets, generators typically offer to supply electricity to the 
system operator for five-minute intervals on a day-ahead basis.134 The following day, 
when the relevant five-minute window opens, the generator has to deliver the 
promised amount of electricity or else compensate the system operator under their 
imbalance settlement for balancing services the latter uses to cover for the 
generator’s lack of performance under their contract. As a concession to their 
weather-dependency and the resulting output intermittency of solar and wind 
generators, this exemption made sense early on when weather data and forecast 
models were lacking and the overall market share of these intermittent generators 
was still small.135  
As forecasts have improved and market shares have grown, however, such 
exemption privileges are no longer required, especially for utility-scale installations. 
Otherwise, these generators externalize the cost of their intermittency with 
ratepayers picking up the tab for balancing services provided by other generators 
filling in for no-show renewables. Over the course of four years, Germany saw a 
near fivefold increase in network operator requests to power plant operators to adjust 
their output to maintain grid stability from 209 requests in 2010 to 1,009 requests in 
2013.136 Recently, Germany has begun to offer additional incentives for renewable 
                                                   
131 See HANS POSER ET AL., FINADVICE, DEVELOPMENT AND INTEGRATION OF 
RENEWABLE ENERGY: LESSONS LEARNED FROM GERMANY 37 (2014), https://docs.wind-
watch.org/germany-lessons-learned-0714.pdf [https://perma.cc/KQZ8-L3KP] (“[T]he offer 
curve of a power market is determined by the marginal costs in ascending order of the 
available power sources. This is the so-called merit order.”); see also Emily Hammond & 
David B. Spence, The Regulatory Contract in the Marketplace, 69 VAND. L. REV. 141, 154 
(2016) (“[W]hen the grid operator dispatches power from individual electric generating 
facilities to the grid, it does so on a least-cost basis.”). 
132 See POSER ET AL., supra note 131, at 3–4, 37–38; see also EDITH BAYER, AGORA 
ENERGIEWENDE, REPORT ON THE GERMAN POWER SYSTEM 22 (2015), http://www.agora-
energiewende.de/fileadmin/downloads/publikationen/CountryProfiles/Agora_CP_Germany
_web.pdf [https://perma.cc/MX3N-UY9W]. 
133 For an introduction to the architecture of the electricity market, see Corinna 
Klessmann et al., Pros and Cons of Exposing Renewables to Electricity Market Risks—A 
Comparison of the Market Integration Approaches in Germany, Spain, and the UK, 36 
ENERGY POL’Y 3646, 3647 (2008). 
134 Id. 
135 See Mormann, Renewables Revolution, supra note 68, at 957 (calling for exemptions 
from forecast and balancing responsibilities for intermittent renewables early in the 
innovation cycle). 
136 See Julia Mengewein, German Utilities Bail Out Electric Grid at Wind’s Mercy, 
BLOOMBERG (July 25, 2014), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2014-07-
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power generators to enter—and play by the rules of—the country’s wholesale power 
markets.137 In the meantime, however, the existing renewables fleet continues to 
enjoy carte blanche—incurring indirect program costs borne by ratepayers who have 
to pay for costly balancing services. 
 
B.  Tender Regimes – Case Study Ireland 
 
As one of the policy’s earliest adopters, Ireland’s experience with competitive 
tenders to promote renewable energy has become the subject of intense study by 
scholars around the world.138 Limited supply of indigenous fuel resources, a 
peripheral location restricting electricity imports from the rest of Europe, and the 
presence of high-quality wind resources led Irish policymakers to adopt the 
Alternative Energy Requirement (AER) to accelerate the deployment of 
renewables.139 During the course of six bidding rounds held over a period of ten 
years, renewable energy projects with a total nameplate capacity of 1,130 megawatts 
(MW) were awarded long-term power purchase agreements.140 In terms of policy 
equity, Ireland’s AER tender regime matches direct costs and benefits moderately 
but receives poor marks for its treatment of indirect costs. 
The Irish tender regime has a mixed track record when it comes to the scope of 
economic benefits it creates. The AER earns points for its sensitivity to the varied 
generation cost profiles of different renewable energy technologies, requiring 
bidders to compete only within the same technology strand.141 The first AER 
auction, for example, solicited separate bids for specified amounts of capacity to be 
provided by wind, hydro, biomass, and cogeneration, respectively.142 Ireland’s 
tender regime further differentiates between renewable power projects based on their 
size, carving out, for example, separate bidding areas for small- and large-scale wind 
projects.143  
                                                   
24/german-utilities-bail-out-electric-grid-at-wind-s-mercy [https://perma.cc/D2SL-SKPR] 
(reporting data for Tennet TSO, Germany’s second-largest grid operator). 
137 See MATT CROUCHER ET AL., AZ SMART, MARKET-BASED INCENTIVES 23–29 
(2010).  
138 See, e.g., SIMONE STEINHILBER, AUCTIONS FOR RENEWABLE ENERGY SUPPORT IN 
IRELAND: INSTRUMENTS AND LESSONS LEARNT (2016); Huber et al., supra note 90; BRIAN 
P. Ó GALLACHÓIR ET AL., WIND ENERGY POLICY DEVELOPMENT IN IRELAND – A CRITICAL 
ANALYSIS (2002); RYAN WISER, BERKELY LAB & CLEAN ENERGY GROUP, THE U.K. NFFO 
AND IRELAND AER COMPETITIVE BIDDING SYSTEMS (2002). 
139 See CROUCHER ET AL., supra note 137, at 52; Ó GALLACHÓIR ET AL., supra note 138. 
140 See H.J. DE VRIES ET AL., ENERGY RESEARCH CTR. OF THE NETHERLANDS, 
RENEWABLE ELECTRICITY POLICIES IN EUROPE 61 (2003); CROUCHER ET AL., supra note 
137, at 55. From an efficacy perspective, the main criticism of Ireland’s AER is that only 
about a third of all contracted capacity was actually installed by 2015. See STEINHILBER, 
supra note 138, at 11. 
141 See STEINHILBER, supra note 138, at 12. 
142 See DE VRIES ET AL., supra note 140, at 57–58; CROUCHER ET AL., supra note 137, 
at 55. 
143 See DE VRIES ET AL., supra note 140, at 57–58. 
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The AER’s sensitivity to generation technology and size, however, is largely 
outweighed by its inability to mobilize a wider range of bidders. The high up-front 
cost required to prepare a competitive bid and the uncertainty of its eventual pay-off 
discourage the vast majority of potential bidders. Only institutional actors or 
incumbent utilities—who possess sufficient overhead capacity and industry-specific 
knowledge—tend to be willing to assume the risk of preparing and submitting a 
costly but ultimately unsuccessful bid. The tender procedure itself has been 
characterized as “a bureaucratic process with several application deadlines which 
create busy periods for those involved . . . and therefore staffing and time 
management problems.” 144 In the case of Ireland’s AER, these tender-typical policy 
challenges are exacerbated by the fact that auctions took place at irregular intervals 
with constantly changing technology preferences leaving potential bidders with 
little, if any, ability to plan ahead.145 A lack of transparency resulting from the 
classification of contract prices awarded under the AER as commercially sensitive 
information reduces incentives for new market entrants.146  
Ireland’s AER receives moderate marks for matching direct costs and benefits. 
The national utility company recovers the extra costs incurred under its tender 
awards through a Public Service Obligation levy.147 Unlike Germany’s feed-in tariff 
levy that, in the interest of international economic competitiveness, exempts energy-
intensive industrial electricity customers, the Irish levy applies without exemption 
spreading the financial burden across all ratepayers.148 Even in the wake of growing 
unrest over the economic impact of Brexit, Irish regulators remain steadfast in their 
refusal to lower the levy for corporate electricity customers.149  
The AER misses a higher policy equity rating, however, because the levy’s 
administration as a flat rate—largely decoupled from a ratepayer’s overall electricity 
consumption150—gives it the effect of a regressive tax that imposes a 
disproportionately large burden on low-income ratepayers. In fact, higher-volume 
electricity customers might well be able to recover part, or even all, of their flat rate 
levy through reductions in volumetric electricity rates thanks to the merit-order 
effect of AER-deployed renewables in the wholesale market.151 This disparity is all 
                                                   
144 Catherine Mitchell, The Renewables NFFO—A Review, 23 ENERGY POL’Y 1077, 
1086 (1995). 
145 See STEINHILBER, supra note 138, at 12. 
146 Id. at 13. 
147 See SHRUTI SHUKLA & STEVE SAWYER, INTERNATIONAL RENEABLE ENERGY 
AGENCY, 30 YEARS OF POLICIES FOR WIND ENERGY: LESSONS FROM 12 WIND ENERGY 
MARKETS 99 (2012).  
148 See COMM’N FOR ENERGY REG., PUBLIC SERVICE OBLIGATION LEVY 2016/17, at 4 
(2016). 
149 Id. at 18–20. 
150 The Public Service Obligation levy distinguishes between three different classes of 
customers—households, small commercial, and medium to large electricity customers. Id. at 
4–5. 
151 See supra note 129 and accompanying text; see also DE VRIES ET AL., supra note 
140, at 57–58.  
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the more problematic considering that the levy’s flat-rate structure hits those hardest 
who, for the reasons outlined above,152 are least likely to partake in the economic 
benefits created by Ireland’s tender regime.  
The AER performs poorly in terms of indirect costs and benefits. From a grid-
management perspective, Ireland’s tender regime engenders indirect costs and 
benefits similar to those caused by Germany’s feed-in tariffs. On the positive side, 
as the tender regime has increased the market share of renewable energy generation, 
the same merit-order effect observed in Germany153 has helped drive down prices in 
the Irish wholesale market for electricity.154 On the negative side, Ireland, like 
Germany, grants dispatch priority to all renewable energy generation at the expense 
of conventional power plants.155  
Unlike Germany, the Irish regulator requires newer wind and other variable 
renewable power generators to assume certain forecast and balancing 
responsibilities that are commonplace for conventional power plants, including 
imbalance settlement payments.156 Older renewable generators with intermittent 
output, including the majority of those developed under the AER regime, however, 
remain exempt from forecast and balancing responsibilities.157 The latter are further 
privileged vis-à-vis the former insofar as they are less likely to be subject to 
curtailment in the event of transmission bottlenecks and other grid constraints.158 
The privileges afforded to AER generators might have seemed reasonable at the time 
to help a fledgling industry. In light of dramatically improved forecast accuracy and 
remote-control capacity for wind and other weather-dependent generators, they are, 
however, difficult to justify today. The continuing preferential treatment for AER 
generators imposes indirect costs on Irish ratepayers as conventional power plants 
but also newer renewable generators pass on the costs for their relatively greater 
balancing responsibilities to bring up the slack caused by exempt legacy generators.  
Beyond grid management and operations, the lack of a reliable auction schedule 
and the resulting stop-and-go nature of the Irish tender regime further imposed 
undue hardship on spatial planning and permitting agencies that have found 
themselves inundated with waves of applications at unpredictable intervals.159 
                                                   
152 See DE VRIES ET AL, supra note 140, at 57–58; Mitchell, supra note 144, at 1086 and 
accompanying text. 
153 See supra note 129 and accompanying text. 
154 See COMM’N FOR ENERGY REG., supra note 148, at 23–24 . 
155 See EIRGRID & SONNI GROUP, ANNUAL RENEWABLE ENERGY CONSTRAINT AND 
CURTAILMENT REPORT 2016 (2017).  
156 See COMM’N FOR ENERGY REG., THE SINGLE ELECTRICITY MARKET (SEM) 
TRADING AND SETTLEMENT CODE 25 (2017) (summarizing the regulatory treatment of 
Variable Price Taker Generator Units). 
157 Id. at 128 (describing the regulatory treatment of Autonomous Generator Units). 
158 See EIRGRID & SONNI GROUP, supra note 155, at 18. 
159 See, e.g., STEINHILBER, supra note 138, at 12 (mourning the “lack of coordination 
between grid connection, permitting procedures, and the auctioning process”); Ó 
GALLACHÓIR ET AL., supra note 138 (reporting that the lack of a reliable auction schedule 
caused developers to withhold planning applications and development work). 
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C.  Net Energy Metering – Case Study United States 
 
Net energy metering policies, adopted by over forty states,160 have emerged as 
the most common tool to remunerate the power output of solar and other distributed 
generation assets.161 Across the country, net metering programs have recently come 
under attack by special interest groups.162 Led by electric utilities, opponents argue 
that net metering enables wealthy homeowners with rooftop solar to effectively stop 
paying for vital network maintenance and upgrades despite using the grid to supply 
electricity to their homes when their solar panels do not produce enough energy to 
meet the homeowner’s demand.163 A closer look at the equity of state net metering 
programs suggests that the current batch of policies does, indeed, leave room for 
improvement. The prevailing net metering model164 performs well in terms of 
matching indirect costs and benefits but provides a poor match between direct costs 
and benefits. 
Net metering programs generally create economic opportunities open to a wide 
range of ratepayers. Pre-determined remuneration rates for excess generation and 
the local utility or network operator’s obligation to allow customers to net meter 
within the limits of a state’s capacity cap minimize transaction costs. As price-based 
policy tools, net metering programs do not require participants to trade in the various 
electricity markets and, hence, offer good revenue certainty. The primary barrier to 
accessing the economic opportunities provided by net metering policies lies in the 
general requirement that participating ratepayers own the real estate that is the site 
of their distributed generation assets.165 The relatively high upfront expenditures and 
                                                   
160 Revesz & Unel, supra note 96, at 47. 
161 See id. at 59. 
162 See, e.g., Hiroko Tabuchi, Rooftop Solar Dims Under Pressure from Utility 
Lobbyists, N.Y. TIMES (July 8, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/07/08/climate/rooftop 
-solar-panels-tax-credits-utility-companies-lobbying.html [https://perma.cc/T4UX-KRPD]; 
Diane Cardwell, Solar Panel Payments Set Off a Fairness Debate, N.Y. TIMES (June 4, 
2012), https://www.nytimes.com/2012/06/05/business/solar-payments-set-off-a-fairness-
debate.html [https://perma.cc/3UH7-LMZF]. 
163 For a thoughtful summary and critique of the various arguments leveled against net 
energy metering programs, see Rule, supra note 17, at 12–47. See also Charles E. Bayless, 
Piggybacking on the Grid: Why Net Energy Metering is Unfair and Inefficient, PUB. UTIL. 
FORT. 38 (2015) (offering a strong critique of net metering customers’ free riding on the 
electric grid at the expense of utilities and other ratepayers). 
164 This article’s equity assessment of net metering policies is based on a stylized model 
that reflects the most prevailing design features across state policies, including remuneration 
at full retail rates, the ability to carry over excess credits, and a cap on the permissible size 
of individual net-metered distributed generation facilities, among others. For a more detailed 
survey of the various design features of state net metering policies, see Revesz & Unel, supra 
note 96, at 59–64. 
165 A growing number of states allow their citizens to participate in community solar 
programs that enable ratepayers to engage in virtual net metering, crediting their share of 
generation from an off-site facility against the ratepayers’ on-site consumption. See, e.g., 
INTERSTATE RENEWABLE ENERGY COUNCIL, FREEING THE GRID 2013: BEST PRACTICES IN 
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overhead costs required to deploy solar and other distributed generation assets 
further limit the practical appeal of net metering policies to higher-consumption 
households.166 
The direct costs imposed by net metering policies are harder to quantify than 
those of other policies. At a glance, one might well assume that ratepayers who use 
customer-sited distributed generation to reduce their net demand for electricity from 
the grid in exchange for a lower utility bill impose no costs on others. After all, 
allowing a ratepayer to run her meter backwards effectively remunerates her on-site 
generation at the local retail rate for electric power.167 In a perfectly competitive 
market, where the clearing price equals marginal cost, the retail rate would reflect 
the cost that the local utility would have incurred to provide the energy now self-
generated by its customer.168 In this perfectly competitive scenario, remunerating the 
customer’s on-site energy production at the retail rate would be cost-neutral for the 
utility who would have incurred generation costs tantamount to the retail revenue it 
foregoes by virtue of net metering.  
In reality, however, retail electricity rates do not reflect the electricity 
providers’ marginal cost of production. In addition to the variable cost of generation, 
retail rates also include charges designed to cover the fixed costs associated with 
transmission and distribution, among other services.169 Even though transmission, 
distribution, ancillary services, and other fixed costs account for over 50 percent of 
the average electricity bill, expressly noted fixed charges make up less than 10 
percent of the total.170 The vast majority of fixed costs is folded into volumetric retail 
rates and, hence, inefficiently tied to a ratepayer’s actual electricity usage. As net 
metering enables customers to reduce their net consumption of utility-provided 
electricity, they avoid paying volumetric rates. At the same time, they also stop 
paying for much of the network-related costs that the utility incurs for their 
continued reliance on the grid as a source of back-up power and a receptacle for their 
excess generation.171 To be clear, net metered distributed generation assets have the 
                                                   
STATE NET METERING POLICIES AND INTERCONNECTION PROCEDURES 20–21 (describing the 
mechanics and benefits of community shared renewables).  
166 See also Revesz & Unel, supra note 96, at 76 (“[B]ecause of the expenses associated 
with owning or leasing solar panels and a greater incentive among high-consumption 
households to pursue distributed generation as a means of lowering utility bills, net metering 
is often disproportionately concentrated among wealthier customers”). 
167 See, e.g., EDISON ELEC. INST., SOLAR ENERGY AND NET METERING 1–2 (2016).  
168 For further information on the underlying concept of “avoided cost” and its 
regulatory treatment, see 16 U.S.C. § 824a–3(b). See also Steven R. Miles, Full-Avoided 
Cost Pricing Under the Public Utility Regulatory Policies Act: “Just and Reasonable” to 
Electric Consumers?, 69 CORNELL L. REV. 1267, 1269 (1984). 
169 For an instructive example of how retail electricity rates are set in regulated markets 
using cost-of-service regulation, see FRED BOSSELMAN ET AL., ENERGY, ECONOMICS, AND 
THE ENVIRONMENT: CASES AND MATERIALS 60–64 (3rd ed. 2015). 
170 See Revesz & Unel, supra note 96, at 72. 
171 See, e.g., AM. LEGISLATIVE EXCHANGE COUNCIL, REFORMING NET METERING: 
PROVIDING A BRIGHT AND EQUITABLE FUTURE 1 (2014) (noting that “distributed generation 
technologies rely extensively upon the electric grid to operate efficiently”); Bayless, supra 
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potential to reduce the local utility’s network-related expenditures,172 but these cost 
savings and other network benefits can be hard to quantify and are more attenuated, 
placing them among net metering’s more indirect benefits discussed below. 
The prevailing practice of recovering fixed costs primarily through 
consumption-dependent, volumetric rates leads to cost shifting among customer 
groups when one group reduces its (net) consumption, be it through energy 
efficiency upgrades, behavioral changes, or net metering. Under the current model, 
a utility no longer able to recover its fixed costs from one group needs to raise its 
volumetric retail rates to make up for the shortfall. While the adjusted rate, in theory, 
applies to all customers alike, the increase imposes a disproportionately large burden 
on those customers whose continued exclusive reliance on utility-provided power 
requires them to pay a significant amount of volumetric charges.173 As a result, 
customers who participate in and benefit from net metering programs contribute the 
least, if anything, to the costs imposed by their selective reliance on the electric grid. 
While the precise magnitude of this cost shifting effect varies by jurisdiction and 
remains in dispute, recent studies suggest that the proliferation of net metered 
distributed generation assets imposes a significant financial burden on other 
ratepayers.174 This cost shifting dynamic earns net metering policies a poor rating 
for their matching of direct costs and benefits. 
Net energy metering policies perform well when it comes to matching indirect 
costs and benefits. Customer-sited distributed generation provides a variety of 
indirect benefits to the grid and the broader pool of electricity market participants. 
Like any other policy that promotes the deployment of clean energy technologies 
with effective dispatch priority, net metering’s merit-order effect175 helps drive 
down wholesale market prices by pushing more expensive plants out of the market, 
to the benefit of all ratepayers. These grid-wide cost savings are especially 
prominent in hot climates where distributed solar generation can help shave peak 
                                                   
note 163, at 39–40 (criticizing the reality that net metering customers may have reached a 
“net zero” threshold on energy for themselves but do so at the expense of a large net negative 
on grid services). 
172 For a thoughtful discussion of these benefits and their sensitivity to local conditions, 
see, e.g., GALEN BARBOSE, LAWRENCE BERKELY NAT’L LAB., PUTTING THE POTENTIAL 
RATE IMPACTS OF DISTRIBUTED SOLAR INTO CONTEXT (2017). 
173 See AM. LEGISLATIVE EXCHANGE COUNCIL, supra note 171, at 8–11 (describing 
how net metering ratepayers shift the cost burden to other ratepayers). 
174 New York utilities, for example, suggest that shifted costs might soon exceed $300 
million annually. Joint Utilities Response to Staff’s Information Request, Case 15-E-0751, 
at 2 (N.Y. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, In the Matter of the Value of Distributed Energy Resources, 
June 10, 2016). California’s utility regulators expect up to $370 million in fixed costs to be 
shifted to non-net-metered ratepayers by 2020. CAL. PUB. UTILS. COMM’N, CALIFORNIA NET 
ENERGY METERING RATEPAYER IMPACTS EVALUATION 6 (2013). 
175 See supra note 129 and accompanying text.  
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demand during mid-day driven by the need for air conditioning, thereby eliminating 
the need for inefficient and costly peaker plants.176  
As discussed earlier, net metered distributed generation also provides value to 
the transmission and distribution systems.177 A customer’s consumption of her self-
generated power, for example, eliminates the need to deliver electricity to her 
through a congested and, hence, less efficient grid and may allow for postponing 
otherwise necessary network upgrades.178 When a net metered customer’s excess 
generation is consumed locally, electricity needs to travel significantly shorter 
distances than from the utility’s generation assets that are often sited well outside 
load centers.179 With line losses accounting for up to 8 percent of a utility’s total 
generation output, the ability of net metering policies to bring generation and 
consumption closer together offers significant efficiency benefits that translate to 
cost savings for all ratepayers.180 
Net metered distributed generation can further help improve the electric grid’s 
resiliency so as to avoid or minimize power outages during extraordinary or 
hazardous events.181 Combined with smart inverters, microgrids, and energy storage, 
distributed generation can fill in for utility-scale generation during extreme weather 
events thereby reducing the frequency and severity of weather-induced service 
interruptions responsible for tens of billions of dollars in economic losses every year 
in the United States alone.182 
The many indirect benefits that net metering policies generate for the electric 
grid and its stakeholders are not free. The two-way traffic of electricity required to 
harness the resiliency improvements, congestion relief, and other benefits of 
distributed generation, for example, requires significant upgrades to a network 
                                                   
176 See also Revesz & Unel, supra note 96, at 79 (“Avoided energy benefits can be 
especially significant if distributed energy resources help avoid generation from costlier peak 
plants.”). 
177 See supra note 172 and accompanying text. 
178 See Revesz & Unel, supra note 96, at 73. The precise value of these benefits is 
difficult to quantify and varies based on seasonal and diurnal grid demand and distributed 
generation output patterns. 
179 See also Joel B. Eisen & Felix Mormann, Free Trade in Electric Power, 2018 UTAH 
L. REV. 49, 59–60 (describing how solar and other non-polluting generation technologies 
can be sited closer to consumers than traditional utility-scale thermal power plants, yielding 
significant benefits to the transmission and distribution systems). 
180 See U.S. DEP’T OF ENERGY, THE POTENTIAL BENEFITS OF DISTRIBUTED 
GENERATION AND RATE-RELATED ISSUES THAT MAY IMPEDE THEIR EXPANSION 3–18 
(2007). 
181 See MILES KEOGH & CHRISTINA CODY, NAT’L ASS’N OF REG. UTIL. COMM’RS, 
RESILIENCE IN REGULATED UTILS. 1 (2013) (offering an industry-wide definition of 
resiliency) [https://perma.cc/9F9N-BCYU]. 
182 See NAT’L RENEWABLE ENERGY LAB., DISTRIBUTED SOLAR PV FOR ELECTRICITY 
SYSTEM RESILIENCY 1 (2014). While there is no universally accepted methodology for 
quantifying the resiliency benefits of distributed generation, studies suggest a monetary value 
of $0.010 to $0.025 per kWh of distributed power generation. See Revesz & Unel, supra 
note 96, at 81. 
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historically designed for the mono-directional flow of electrons from utility-scale 
power plants to consumers.183  
The peak-shaving benefits associated with net metered distributed generation 
also come at a cost. As illustrated by the (in)famous California duck curve, solar and 
other weather-dependent distributed resources require fast-ramping back-up power 
to maintain the grid’s delicate balance between demand and supply.184 As net 
metering and distributed generation continue to proliferate, conventional plants will 
increasingly have to ramp down during the day and stand by to, quickly, ramp up in 
the event of cloud cover or other adverse weather conditions and, of course, as the 
sun sets. This ramping up and down, or cycling, increases the average operating 
costs of affected plants and, ultimately, requires additional compensation from 
utilities and their ratepayers.185 To be sure, all of the policies discussed here require 
back-up power to make up for variations in the output from solar, wind, and other 
intermittent renewables. Net metering policies, however, pose a particularly iffy 
challenge for network operators because the behind-the-meter location of net 
metered distributed generation assets exacerbates the difficulty in predicting and 
managing their net impact on grid demand.186 
  
D.  Tax Credits – Case Study United States 
 
Federal tax credits for clean energy provide a poor match between direct 
program costs and benefits, and score poorly on indirect costs and benefits, too. This 
overall poor report card for the primary federal policy instrument to support solar, 
wind, and other renewables may come as a surprise to some considering the strong 
support for federal tax breaks within the renewable energy industry.187 The scholarly 
literature, however, has long critiqued tax credit support for clean energy as “the rich 
man’s feed-in tariff.”188 
                                                   
183 See Eisen & Mormann, supra note 179, at 61 (explaining how the electric grid’s 
current architecture, frequently dating back to the late nineteenth and early twentieth century, 
is poorly adapted to accommodate and harness the many benefits offered by distributed 
generation); Revesz & Unel, supra note 96, at 83 (discussing the additional strains that bi-
directional flow of electricity imposes on the grid). 
184 See, e.g., CAL. INDEP. SYS. OPERATOR, WHAT THE DUCK CURVE TELLS US ABOUT 
MANAGING A GREEN GRID 3 (2013), http://www.caiso.com/Documents/ FlexibleResources 
HelpRenewables_FastFacts.pdf [https://perma.cc/LUS5-47VU].  
185 See MASS. INST. OF TECH., THE FUTURE OF THE ELECTRIC GRID 64 (2011). 
186 See, e.g., Mormann et al., supra note 8, at 68–69 (noting the California grid 
operator’s difficulty in keeping track of distributed solar facilities that are customer-owned 
and located behind the meter). 
187 See, e.g., Tax Policy, AM. WIND ENERGY ASS’N, https://www.awea.org/policy-and-
issues/tax-policy [https://perma.cc/X223-U8NX]; Solar Investment Tax Credit, SOLAR 
ENERGY INDUSTRIES ASS’N, http://www.seia.org/policy/finance-tax/solar-investment-tax-
credit [https://perma.cc/FK65-4AYR].  
188 David Toke, Are Green Electricity Certificates the Way Forward for Renewable 
Energy? An Evaluation of the United Kingdom’s Renewables Obligation in the Context of 
International Comparisons, 23 ENV’T & PLANNING C. GOV’T & POL’Y 361, 368 (2005). 
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Federal tax credits score poorly in terms of terms of matching direct costs and 
benefits because they create economic opportunities only for a small group of banks, 
financial firms, and other highly profitable corporations.189 This limited economic 
appeal is due to the mismatch between tax credits’ inherent profitability 
requirements and the revenue profile of renewable power projects.190 Many project 
developers lack the quintessential requirement to benefit from federal tax breaks—
a tax bill that is high enough to offset and thereby realize the full and immediate 
monetary value of tax credits.191 Renewable power plants may not incur the same 
fuel costs as their fossil fuel counterparts, but they require relatively greater up-front 
capital expenditures for planning, construction, and equipment.192 It frequently takes 
ten or more years before a renewable power project has recovered these expenditures 
and begins to generate the necessary profits and tax liability to use its tax credits.193 
To be sure, the project developer could simply carry forward her tax credits year 
after year until her tax bill eventually is high enough, but, in the case of a standalone 
wind project, for example, this lack of current tax liabilities would cost her up to 
two-thirds of the net present value of her project’s tax benefits.194  
                                                   
189 Historically, fewer than two dozen highly profitable and sophisticated entities—
mostly large banks, insurance companies, and other financial firms—have been willing and 
able to support renewable energy projects through their tax equity investments. See 
BIPARTISAN POL’Y CTR., REASSESSING RENEWABLE ENERGY SUBSIDIES—ISSUE BRIEF 10 
(2011). 
190 See Mormann, Beyond Tax Credits, supra note 18, at 303. 
191 See Bolinger et al., supra note 100, at 6804; STEVE CORNELI, U.S. PARTNERSHIP FOR 
RENEWABLE ENERGY FIN., CLEAN ENERGY AND TAX REFORM: HOW TAX POLICY CAN HELP 
RENEWABLE ENERGY CONTRIBUTE TO ECONOMIC GROWTH, ENERGY SECURITY AND A 
BALANCED BUDGET 13 (2012); BIPARTISAN POL’Y CTR., supra note 189, at 9; MINTZ LEVIN 
& GTM RESEARCH, RENEWABLE ENERGY PROJECT FINANCE IN THE U.S.: 2010–2013 
OVERVIEW AND FUTURE OUTLOOK (2012), http://www.mintz.com/DesktopModules/Bring 
2mind/DMX/Download.aspx?EntryId=231&PortalId=0&DownloadMethod=attachment 
[https://perma.cc/L9AK-NLJ2]; see also JOHN P. HARPER ET AL., LAWRENCE BERKELEY 
NAT’L LAB., WIND PROJECT FINANCING STRUCTURES: A REVIEW & COMPARATIVE 
ANALYSIS (2007), http://emp.lbl.gov/sites/all/files/REPORT%20lbnl%20-%2063434.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/CA87-58QD] (noting that only a handful of large developers are able to 
make use of the federal tax credits). 
192 See HARPER ET AL., supra note 191, at i (comparing up-front capital expenditures 
relative to generation capacity). 
193 See PHILIP BROWN & MOLLY F. SHERLOCK, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R41635, 
ARRA SECTION 1603 GRANTS IN LIEU OF TAX CREDITS FOR RENEWABLE ENERGY: 
OVERVIEW, ANALYSIS, AND POLICY OPTIONS 8 (2011). For a wind project, for example, it 
takes approximately twelve years to fully work through net operating losses from 
depreciation deductions before the project even begins to generate the taxable income 
required to be able to self-monetize available tax credits. Bolinger et al., supra note 100, at 
17. 
194 UDAY VARADARAJAN ET AL., CLIMATE POLICY INITIATIVE, SUPPORTING 
RENEWABLES WHILE SAVING TAXPAYERS MONEY 1, 4 (2012). 
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Enter the “tax equity”195 investor whose participation enables the developer to 
monetize the project’s tax credits in a timely fashion.196 Such tax equity investment 
effectively allows a renewable energy project to sell the tax credits that the project 
itself cannot presently monetize against its own income to the tax equity investor.197 
But tax equity investors are few and far between—and they exploit their exclusivity 
status to exact higher rates of return than the risk profile of their involvement would 
normally warrant.198 The tax equity market’s cyclical nature further reduces the 
value of tax credits during economic downturns when developers need them most.199 
To make matters worse, the tax code renders tax equity for renewable energy a 
highly illiquid investment thereby impeding the formation of secondary markets that 
would allow developers to refinance their projects in the near to medium term.200 In 
addition, participation of a tax equity investor in renewable power projects requires 
complex and costly deal structures that drive up transaction costs.201 The need to 
                                                   
195 Tax equity, not to be confused with the concept of equity as used elsewhere in this 
Article, is a hybrid investment position that combines characteristics of conventional debt 
and equity stakes. Like traditional equity, tax equity bears the ultimate performance risk of 
a project. Like debt, tax equity receives preferential treatment regarding project cash flows. 
These include positive cash flows such as payments under a power purchase agreement with 
a local utility or other off-taker and, most importantly, negative cash flows in the form of tax 
credits and other benefits that the tax equity investor can use to offset her tax liabilities 
outside of the project. See, e.g., BROWN & SHERLOCK, supra note 193, at 17–19; CORNELI, 
supra note 191, at 13; BIPARTISAN POL’Y CTR., supra note 189, at 9. 
196 See, e.g., ETHAN ZINDLER & TYLER TRINGAS, BLOOMBERG NEW ENERGY FIN., 
CASH IS KING: SHORTCOMINGS OF US TAX CREDITS IN SUBSIDIZING RENEWABLES 2 (2009). 
197 See, generally, Mormann, Beyond Tax Credits, supra note 18, at 325–26. 
198 See BROWN & SHERLOCK, supra note 193, at 18; HARPER ET AL., supra note 191, 
at v; MINTZ LEVIN & GTM RESEARCH, supra note 191, at 8; see also Mormann, Beyond Tax 
Credits, supra note 18, at 326–27 (pointing to higher-quality project development as a 
positive side effect of competition among developers for a spot at the tax equity trough). 
199 See, e.g., MINTZ LEVIN & GTM RESEARCH, supra note 191, at 3 (“Macro-trends in 
tax equity financing . . . are highly correlated to the financial health of a limited number of 
large financial institutions.”). 
200 The investment tax credit for solar and other renewable projects, for instance, 
becomes available in full in the year that the facility is placed into service. But the credit 
actually takes five years to linearly vest in its entirety requiring the tax equity investor to 
hold on to her stake in the project for at least five years in order to realize the tax credit’s full 
value. Should the investor decide to pull out of the project earlier, say after three years, the 
non-vested portion of her tax credit, in this case 40 percent, would be subject to recapture 
and the associated tax savings would need to be paid back to the Internal Revenue Service 
(IRS). See 26 U.S.C. § 50(a)(1)(B) (2018). 
201 The tax code’s general prohibition of trafficking in tax credits and other tax attributes 
according to 26 U.S.C. § 382 (2012) rules out a straight-forward sale of these attributes and, 
instead, requires inventive—and costly—deal structures in order to legally assign what 
would otherwise be the developer’s tax benefits to the tax equity investor. The three main 
tax equity structures in use today are the partnership flip, the sale-leaseback, and the inverted 
lease. DIPA SHARIF ET AL., BLOOMBERG NEW ENERGY FIN., THE RETURN – AND RETURNS – 
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bring in a tax equity investor, finally, limits a developer’s ability to raise project 
capital from other, more cost-efficient sources as tax equity often forestalls less 
expensive debt financing.202  
In the end, even when bringing in a tax equity investor, renewable energy 
developers can realize no more than two-thirds of the value of their project’s tax 
benefits.203 The highly limited economic appeal of federal tax credits for renewables, 
therefore, bodes ill not only for the policy’s equity and but also for its cost 
efficiency.204 
The poor equity rating of federal tax credits is driven by the de facto reservation 
of direct program benefits to a small group of tax equity investors while funding for 
these credits comes out of the U.S. Treasury’s general tax revenue thereby spreading 
the cost across all taxpayers. The enormous discrepancy between this quasi-
socialization of costs and the oligopolization of economic opportunities flies in the 
face of commensurately matching costs and benefits as required under this Article’s 
equity framework. 
In terms of indirect costs and benefits, federal tax credits for renewables rate 
poorly due to their disruptive effect on wholesale electricity markets. On the positive 
side, tax-credit-funded renewable power capacity has helped reduce wholesale 
market clearing prices thanks to the same merit-order effect discussed above.205 The 
production tax credit has, however, forced network operators to increasingly send 
out negative price signals to encourage generators to ramp down their power output 
during times of low demand—at the expense of other, especially non-wind, 
generators. To be sure, negative price signals predate the Energy Policy Act of 1992 
that created the production tax credit, but they have become much more frequent 
since. That is because wind power generators earn production tax credits only for 
electricity they generate and feed into the grid for sale to a third party.206 The latter 
requirement has had a profound effect on wholesale electricity markets. Historically, 
network operators could effectively signal to power plants that they should decrease 
their output, or ramp down, by gradually reducing the offer price near or, in some 
cases, to zero. With no fuel requirement to drive marginal costs and a production tax 
credit tied to power production and sales, however, wind generators continue to 
produce and feed power into the grid unless and until prices go so far below zero 
                                                   
OF TAX EQUITY FOR US RENEWABLE PROJECTS 10–15 (2011) (offering a concise comparison 
across all three tax equity structures). 
202 Tax equity investors are wary of losing their preferred access to project cash flows 
to lenders. See supra note 195 (describing the preferred access to project cash flows for tax 
equity investors). In addition, the complex deal structures required for tax equity deals 
preclude purely debt-financed projects. See Chadbourne & Parke LLP, supra note 103, 
at 34–35 (describing how debt financing would take over if tax credits were replaced with 
direct cash subsidies).  
203 See VARADARAJAN ET AL., supra note 194, at 4. 
204 See Mormann, Beyond Tax Credits, supra note 18, at 315; VARADARAJAN ET AL., 
supra note 194, at 4 . 
205 See supra note 131 and accompanying text. 
206 See 26 U.S.C. § 45(a)(2)(B) (2018).  
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that they eat up all of their tax credits. As a result, where network operators used to 
send a zero-price signal, in wind-rich markets they now have to use a negative price 
signal actually penalizing other generators who may struggle to ramp down their 
output quickly enough at times of low demand.207 These negative price signals 
impose harsh burdens on generators without tax credits, such as coal power plants 
who take longer than others to ramp down and, ultimately pay a penalty in the 
amount of negative pricing required to persuade wind generators and other recipients 
of production tax credits that they should reduce their output to maintain the electric 
grid’s delicate balance between demand and supply.208 
 
E.  Renewable Portfolio Standards – Case Study United States 
 
Renewable portfolio standards—adopted by twenty-nine states, three U.S. 
territories, and the District of Columbia—have evolved as one of the principal 
drivers of clean energy deployment in the United States. Minor differences across 
state policies notwithstanding,209 the prevailing model of renewable portfolio 
standards receives moderate equity marks in terms of direct costs and benefits due 
to the limited pool of economic beneficiaries compared to the allocation of 
procurement costs across all ratepayers. They earn excellent marks, however, 
regarding indirect costs and benefits thanks to the planning certainty they afford to 
network operators and their role as a potential gateway policy for cap-and-trade 
regimes. How is it that one of the most widely adopted and longest-standing clean 
energy policies in the United States is not more equitable in its distribution of direct 
costs and benefits? The answer to this question lies in the considerable revenue 
uncertainty and transaction costs that renewable portfolio standards impose on 
generators and their investors.  
Unlike feed-in tariffs and other price-based policies that guarantee a specific 
rate for renewable electricity, portfolio standards rely on the fluctuating market 
forces of demand and supply to determine the ultimate level of remuneration for 
                                                   
207 See, e.g., FRANK HUNTOWSKI, AARON PATTERSON & MICHAEL SCHNITZER, THE 
NORTHBRIDGE GROUP, NEGATIVE ELECTRICITY PRICES AND THE PRODUCTION TAX CREDIT 
12 fig. 8 (2012), http://www.hks.harvard.edu/hepg/Papers/2012/Negative_Electricity_Prices 
_and_the_Production_Tax_Credit_0912.pdf [https://perma.cc/R3TT-JQX8]; id. at 12 
(“Negative prices are most prevalent when wind output is highest relative to overall demand, 
such as during the overnight hours in the spring and fall months when wind output is high 
but demand is relatively low and less power is needed.”).  
208 Some may consider the prevalence of negative price signals in wind-rich markets 
and their detrimental impact on conventional generators a feature rather than a bug. After all, 
the stated policy goal of tax incentives for clean energy is to increase the market share of 
solar, wind, and other low-carbon renewables—at the expense of coal and other incumbents. 
As before, see supra note 130, this Article’s equity inquiry does not pass judgment on the 
strategic value of such policy characteristics but merely seeks to bring them to the fore so 
that readers may from their own opinion. See supra Section I.C. 
209 For an instructive overview of differences in design and implementation across state 
renewable portfolio standards, see Davies, supra note 109, at 1398–1403 (comparing 
resource eligibility, REC shelf life, and other key features across state policies). 
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renewable power.210 In fact, portfolio standard policies often require renewable 
generators to trade on not one but two separate markets—the wholesale electricity 
market for selling their power output and the REC market for selling their credits.211 
As a result, generators find themselves exposed to the price risk of two distinct 
markets, each with its own set of risks and rules. Day-ahead trading in wholesale 
electricity markets, for instance, may require weather-dependent solar or wind 
generators to submit a bid for power they may prove unable to supply when called 
upon the next day.212 On the REC side, fragmented and often illiquid markets may 
expose generators to extreme trading volatility as illustrated by geographic price 
fluctuations ranging from $1.75 in California to $35.00 in New England for a credit 
issued for 1 MWh of wind energy.213 Within a one-year period, temporal price 
fluctuations have been reported to range from $6.00 to nearly $40.00 for 1 MWh 
worth of Connecticut RECs.214  
A renewable portfolio standard’s inherent requirement that eligible generators 
participate in two separate markets not only increases their overall exposure to 
market risk but also drives up associated transaction costs. In contrast to a feed-in 
tariff or tender regime, portfolio standards require renewable generators to negotiate 
and execute one or more power purchase agreements to sell their output.215 Together, 
the heightened market risks and transaction costs impose significant barriers to 
access to the economic opportunities created under renewable portfolio standards. 
This exclusivity has led some to characterize portfolio standards as “‘big 
corporation’ policies” with “neutral or negative effects on smaller, entrepreneurial 
firms.”216 To be sure, firms such as SolarCity, Sungevity, or SunRun offer to assume 
some of the market risks and manage the necessary transactions on behalf of 
residential and other, smaller-scale generators, but these intermediaries charge a fee 
for their involvement that reduces the overall economic upside to generators.217 
While not quite as exclusive as tax credits, renewable portfolio standards suffer from 
a similarly limited access to the policy’s economic benefits. 
                                                   
210 See supra notes 106–109 and accompanying text. 
211 See Mormann, Clean Energy Federalism, supra note 14, at 1660. 
212 See Klessmann et al., supra note 133, at 3647. 
213 See Benjamin K. Sovacool & Christopher Cooper, Congress Got it Wrong: The Case 
for a National Renewable Portfolio Standard and Implications for Policy, 3 ENVTL. & 
ENERGY L. & POL’Y J. 85, 105 (2008). 
214 See Ryan Wiser et al., The Experience with Renewable Portfolio Standards in the 
United States, 20 ELECTRICITY J. 8, 16 (2007). 
215 See Mormann, Investor Appeal of Renewable Energy, supra note 16, at 713. 
216 Mary Jean Bürer & Rolf Wüstenhagen, Which Renewable Energy Policy Is a 
Venture Capitalist’s Best Friend? Empirical Evidence from a Survey of International 
Cleantech Investors, 37 ENERGY POL’Y 4997, 5005 (2009). 
217 See, e.g., KATHARINE KOLLINS ET AL., U.S. DEP’T OF ENERGY, SOLAR PV PROJECT 
FINANCING REGULATORY AND LEGISLATIVE CHALLENGES FOR THIRD-PARTY PPA SYSTEM 
OWNERS (2010) (giving an overview of the competing models for third-party financing of 
solar systems). 
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The limited number of economic beneficiaries stands in stark contrast to the 
allocation of program costs across all ratepayers. The extra costs incurred by a utility 
to procure the RECs necessary to comply with the standard’s sourcing requirement 
are usually folded into its retail electricity rates thereby spreading the financial 
burden across all ratepayers pro rata of their power consumption.218 A cost 
allocation that so closely correlates the financing of a clean energy policy with the 
consumption of energy and, hence, the environmental and other social costs of its 
generation might warrant top marks in terms of environmental equity. For purposes 
of the present inquiry into a policy’s economic equity, however, the mismatch 
between the quasi-socialization of costs and the limited availability of economic 
opportunities created by renewable portfolio standards prevents a higher than 
moderate rating. 
Renewable portfolio standards receive excellent marks regarding indirect costs 
and benefits thanks to the planning stability they afford to grid operators and to the 
priming effect they have in preparing constituents for cap-and-trade policies as an 
economy-wide approach to greenhouse gas emission reductions. With their market 
reliance for pricing and remuneration, portfolio standards do not require dispatch 
priority and, hence, need not impose negative externalities on other generators. At 
the same time, they deliver similar merit-order benefits to wholesale markets as the 
above policies. When policymakers adopt renewable portfolio standards mandating 
that a certain percentage of retail electricity sales come from renewables, they create 
demand and, hence, a market for renewable power and, at the same time, limit the 
size of that market.219 As deployed capacity and projects already underway approach 
the mandated demand target, developers looking to benefit from the policy’s 
financial incentives will be wary to launch new projects.220  
Under a feed-in tariff or similar price-based policy, the volume and pace of 
renewable energy deployment depend on the interplay between policy remuneration, 
hardware costs, installation costs, and other factors subject to changing market 
conditions. If costs come down faster than anticipated, a level of policy remuneration 
that was reasonable at the outset may become overly generous leading to greater-
than-expected deployment. Germany experienced such an overheating in its solar 
market during the early 2010s when the country’s feed-in tariff rates failed to adjust 
to rapidly declining prices for solar panels.221 The resulting surge in solar 
deployment created enormous challenges for grid management and operations.222 
With their simultaneous creation and limitation of clean energy markets, renewable 
                                                   
218 See Davies, supra note 109, at 1363–64. 
219 See Mormann, Investor Appeal of Renewable Energy, supra note 16, at 712 
(discussing the cap inherent in the sourcing requirements set by renewable portfolio 
standards). 
220 See Michael Mendelsohn, Does RPS Still Gun the Engines, RENEWABLE ENERGY 
PROJECT FIN. (Nov. 7, 2012, 10:00 AM), https://financere.nrel.gov/finance/content/does-rps-
still-gun-engines [https://perma.cc/Z2HG-YCKK] (questioning the capacity of state RPS 
programs to drive deployment as achievement of the RPS target draws nearer).  
221 See Mormann et al., supra note 8, at 97. 
222 See supra note 135 and accompanying text. 
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portfolio standards enable network operators to anticipate growth in order to ensure 
the grid’s ability to absorb a growing share of intermittent renewable power 
generators. This planning certainty is all the more pronounced when the sourcing 
requirement ramps up gradually over a period of several years, as is the case under 
most renewable portfolio standards in the United States.223  
The second driver behind the excellent rating of portfolio standards in terms of 
indirect costs and benefits is their educational impact setting the stage for future 
implementation of cap-and-trade policies to promote greenhouse gas emission 
reductions. Recent research suggests that green industrial policies like feed-in tariffs 
and renewable portfolio standards fuel progress toward more comprehensive climate 
policies, such as a tax on carbon or a cap-and-trade regime.224 This enabling effect 
of green industrial policies is attributed to their moving economic constituents into 
coalitions for decarbonization and creating positive feedback loops.225 The same 
rationale would apply to all clean energy support policies discussed in this Part and, 
therefore, would not warrant special recognition of the renewable portfolio standard. 
The latter, however, goes above and beyond the previously discussed policies 
insofar as its market reliance helps familiarize key stakeholders—from regulators to 
utilities to generators—with the trading dynamics that are crucial to a successful 
cap-and-trade regime, one of the policies economists consider most promising to 
decarbonize the energy economy and mitigate global climate change.226 
 
F.  Summary and Suggestions for Reform 
 
The preceding inquiry into the policy equity of the leading policies in place to 
promote clean energy technologies today offers but a snapshot of the broader, 
increasingly diverse policy landscape. The limited sample size of one case study per 
policy and the need to distinguish between conceptual and implementation issues 
caution against drawing overly general conclusions. Accordingly, this Section 
expressly focuses on the respective policy as implemented in the studied jurisdiction. 
To the extent that other jurisdictions have followed a similar implementation route 
for the same policy, however, some of the following observations and suggestions 
for reform may translate to these jurisdictions. Table 2 summarizes the policy equity 
ratings for the studied policies and jurisdictions. 
                                                   
223 See, e.g., CAL. PUB. UTIL. CODE § 399.30(c)(2) (West 2017) (laying out the ramp-
up schedule for California’s renewable portfolio standard, from 25% by the end of 2016 to 
33% by 2020, 44% by 2024, 52% by 2027, and 60% by 2030).  
224 See Jonas Meckling et al., Winning Coalitions for Climate Policy: Green Industrial 
Policy Builds Support for Carbon Regulation, 349 SCI. 1170, 1170 (2015).  
225 Id.; see also Eric Biber, Cultivating a Green Political Landscape: Lessons for 
Climate Change Policy from the Defeat of California’s Proposition 23, 66 VAND. L. REV. 
399, 426 (2013) (“The first priority in climate change policy should be to increase the 
economic and political support for future climate legislation by building the industry that has 
a political and economic stake in expanding climate legislation.”). 
226 See, e.g., Robert N. Stavins, A Meaningful U.S. Cap-and-Trade System to Address 
Climate Change, 32 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 293, 296–97 (2008).  
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POLICY POLICY EQUITY RATING 
(Case Study) Direct Indirect 
FEED-IN TARIFF 
(GERMANY) 
Moderate Moderate 
TENDER REGIMES 
(IRELAND) 
Moderate Poor 
NET METERING 
(UNITED STATES) 
Poor Good 
TAX CREDITS 
(UNITED STATES) 
Poor Poor 
PORTFOLIO STANDARDS 
(UNITED STATES) 
Moderate Excellent 
 
Table 2: Policy Equity Ratings for Case Studies 
 
Feed-in tariffs, as implemented in Germany, display moderate overall policy 
equity with points scored for relatively widespread access to the policy’s direct 
economic benefits but points deducted for the German policymaker’s decision to 
exempt nearly 2,000 of the country’s most energy-intensive firms from bearing 
direct program costs. Two tweaks would go a long way toward improving direct 
policy equity. First, industrial ratepayers should be required to contribute their share 
to the levy imposed to finance feed-in tariff payments. Concerns over international 
competitiveness could be addressed through increased self-generation for on-site 
consumption thereby lowering an industrial firm’s overall consumption of grid-
provided electricity and, hence, its obligations under the feed-in tariff levy. Second, 
the German feed-in tariff could be amended to enable greater participation by 
ratepayers who do not own real property, for example through community-level 
projects such as those championed by wind cooperatives in Denmark.227 Indirect 
policy equity of Germany’s commitment to low-carbon renewables suffers primarily 
due to the externalization of balancing efforts and costs by renewable power 
generators exempt from the grid’s usual forecasting and balancing requirements. 
Acceleration of the ongoing shift toward greater forecast and balancing the 
responsibility of solar, wind, and other intermittent generators would go a long way 
toward relieving the burden on other generators and improving indirect policy 
equity. 
                                                   
227 See H. C. SOERSENSEN ET AL., INT’L SOC’Y OF OFFSHORE AND POLAR ENGINEERS, 
MIDDELGRUNDEN 40 MW OFFSHORE WIND FARM, A PRESTUDY FOR THE DANISH OFFSHORE 
750 MW WIND PROGRAM 1 (2000), http://www.middelgrunden.dk/middelgrunden/sites/ 
default/files/public/file/Middelgrunden%2040%20MW%20offshore%20wind%20farm%20
prestudy.pdf [https://perma.cc/CP7K-SDML] (reporting that, by 2001, more than 100,000 
Danish families were part of wind cooperatives that accounted for 80 percent of the country’s 
wind turbines). 
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Ireland’s tender regime offers moderate direct policy equity but performs 
poorly in terms of indirect policy equity. On the positive side, Ireland allocates direct 
costs across all ratepayers without exemptions and uses technology-specific auctions 
to create economic opportunities for a greater range of projects. A higher rating is 
prevented, however, by the auction process’s complexity, lack of transparency, and 
limited planning certainty for potential bidders, restricting the program’s ability to 
mobilize a greater pool of participants in the tender rounds. Improvements to the 
auction process would help raise both direct and indirect policy equity while 
converting the tender regime’s surcharge from a flat rate fee to a levy that allocates 
costs pro rata a ratepayer’s electricity consumption would positively impact direct 
policy equity. 
The prevailing model of state net metering policies offers good indirect policy 
equity but delivers poor direct policy equity. From enhanced resiliency to congestion 
relief and peak shaving, net metering provides a host of indirect benefits to the 
electric grid and its stakeholders. These benefits come at the cost of grid upgrades 
and higher fees for fast-ramping back-up power, among others. In the end, both the 
indirect costs and benefits associated with net metering tend to accrue primarily at 
the ratepayer level, delivering good indirect policy equity. The same, unfortunately, 
cannot be said of the match between net metering’s direct costs and benefits. 
Economic opportunities are relatively accessible, at least for homeowners, but 
access could be significantly expanded through more widespread adoption of 
community-solar and virtual net metering programs.228 They are financed, in large 
part, through cost shifting from net metering ratepayers to their non-net metering 
counterparts, raising serious equity concerns. These cost shifts are by no means an 
ineluctable by-product of net metering, however. A simple tweak to utility rate-
setting and billing practices would go a long way toward improving the policy equity 
of net metering. Once the fixed charges currently folded into volumetric retail rates 
are billed separately and thus decoupled from a ratepayer’s consumption, 
remuneration of net metering customers at retail rates will entail significantly less 
cost shifting among different groups of ratepayers. Conversely, better understanding 
and quantification of the time- and location-variant system benefits produced by 
distributed generation would allow to adjust the overall compensation for net 
metering customers where appropriate.  
Federal tax credits receive a poor overall policy equity rating due to the gross 
mismatch between the oligopolization of direct economic benefits among a small 
group of high-income tax investors and the quasi-socialization of direct program 
costs across American taxpayers. Indirect policy equity is hurt by wholesale market 
distortions resulting from the need for negative price signals to discourage wind 
                                                   
228 A growing number of states are adopting policies to require community-solar virtual 
net metering programs where ratepayers use off-site solar generation to reduce their 
electricity bills. See, e.g., Gabriel Chan et al., Design Choices and Equity Implications of 
Community Shared Solar, 30 ELECRICITY J. 37, 37, 40 (2017) (discussing programs in fifteen 
states and the District of Columbia, noting that the “normative goal to increase access to 
solar energy for those without an adequate roof or finances” is at the heart of community-
solar programs).  
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generators from feeding surplus power into the grid during times of low demand. 
The latter distortion could be remedied by replacing the production tax credit regime 
for wind power with the kind of investment tax credit that has proven to be an 
effective driver of solar deployment.229 Overall policy equity of either type of tax 
credit would further be improved significantly if tax credits for renewable energy 
were made refundable thereby obviating the need for costly tax investment 
structures to monetize these credits in a timely fashion.230 
The prevailing model of state-level renewable portfolio standards receives 
excellent marks for its indirect policy equity thanks to the planning stability that 
these programs offer to grid operators and their role as primers for a future cap-and-
trade regime to regulate economy-wide greenhouse gas emissions. Direct policy 
equity, meanwhile, is no more than moderate due to revenue uncertainty and 
transaction costs that restrict access to the policy’s economic benefits. These barriers 
to access will be difficult to eliminate altogether without sacrificing the market 
reliance that defines renewable portfolio standards. They could, however, be 
mitigated through better coordination among state policymakers toward a unified 
market for RECs resulting in greater liquidity and lower price volatility.231 Another 
option would be the joint implementation of renewable portfolio standards and feed-
in tariffs to simultaneously reduce both investor and regulatory risk thereby 
promoting more widespread participation in these policies.232 
 
IV.  POLYCENTRICITY AS A CATALYST FOR GREATER POLICY EQUITY 
 
Assessing and, more importantly, improving policy equity requires a deep 
understanding of the flow of costs and benefits—direct and indirect—generated by 
clean energy policy. Direction and magnitude of these flows will depend on program 
specifics as well as the investment needs and abilities of stakeholders. As a first step 
toward more equitable clean energy policy, the process of policymaking, from 
design to adoption to implementation, should become more inclusive.  
The polycentric approach to governance championed by Professors Elinor and 
Vincent Ostrom offers a promising path forward. For the Ostroms and their 
colleagues, polycentricity connotes multiple centers of decisionmaking that are 
formally independent of each other but may, in practice, interact through 
competitive relationships, collaborative endeavors, and otherwise function in a 
                                                   
229 See, e.g., SOLAR ENERGY INDUS. ASS’N, SOLAR ITC IMPACT ANALYSIS, 
https://www.seia.org/sites/default/files/ITC%20Impact%20Analysis%20Factsheet_Sep201
5.pdf [https://perma.cc/VKM7-GZ5M]. 
230 The tax code has long recognized refundable tax credits such as the Child Tax Credit 
under 26 U.S.C. § 24 (2018) or the Earned Income Tax Credit under 26 U.S.C. § 32 (2018). 
231 See Mormann, Clean Energy Federalism, supra note 14, at 1644 (discussing the 
benefits of a unified REC trading market).  
232 See Felix Mormann, Re-Allocating Risk: The Case for Closer Integration of Price- 
and Quantity-Based Support Policies for Clean Energy, 27 ELECTRICITY J. 9, 15 (2014) 
(proposing a model for greater integration of feed-in tariffs and renewable portfolio standards 
toward better mitigation and allocation of investor and regulatory risk). 
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coherent manner.233 Late in her career, Nobel Laureate Elinor Ostrom advocated for 
a more polycentric approach to climate governance.234 According to Ostrom, 
polycentricity tends to “enhance innovation, learning, adaptation, trustworthiness, 
levels of cooperation of participants, and the achievement of more effective, 
equitable, and sustainable outcomes at multiple scales.”235  
Compared to traditional, monocentric governance models, polycentric 
decisionmaking offers two chief advantages of relevance to climate and clean energy 
policy.236 First, polycentric approaches provide greater opportunities for 
experimentation and learning to improve policies over time. Second, they increase 
communications and interactions among parties facilitating the exchange of critical 
information while building the mutual trust necessary for better cooperation.  
Clean energy policymaking in the United States already leverages many of the 
benefits flowing from policy experimentation and learning across jurisdictions and 
institutions. In the absence of a comprehensive federal policy approach to clean 
energy, states and municipalities have stepped up to fill the policy void, breathing 
life into the Brandeisian vision of states as laboratories of democracy.237 The 
resulting policy potpourri showcases an impressive diversity, running the gamut 
from top-down regulatory mandates to market-based approaches, with ample 
evidence of inter-jurisdictional policy learning.238 Intra-jurisdictional 
communication, learning, and cooperation among institutions and stakeholders, 
however, continues to lag. 
Over a quarter-century ago, Professor Richard Lazarus effectively jumpstarted 
the legal literature on environmental justice when he lamented the lack of 
participatory processes in environmental policymaking and called for more 
widespread access to relevant decisionmaking fora.239 Shortly after, Professor Alice 
Kaswan noted the widespread perception of environmental law as a “significant 
                                                   
233 See Vincent Ostrom, et al., The Organization of Government in Metropolitan Areas: 
A Theoretical Inquiry, 55 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 831, 831–32 (1961); see also Elinor Ostrom, 
Beyond Markets and States: Polycentric Governance of Complex Economic Systems, 100 
AM. ECON. REV. 641 (2010) (tracing the genesis and evolution of the polycentric governance 
approach). 
234 See Elinor Ostrom, A Polycentric Approach for Coping with Climate Change 32–39 
(The World Bank Policy Research, Working Paper No. 5095, 2009). 
235 Elinor Ostrom, Polycentric Systems for Coping with Collective Action and Global 
Environmental Change, 20 GLOB. ENVTL. CHANGE 550, 552 (2010). 
236 See Daniel H. Cole, Advantages of a Polycentric Approach to Climate Change 
Policy, 5 NATURE CLIMATE CHANGE 114, 114 (2015). 
237 See New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J., 
dissenting).  
238 See, e.g., Mormann, Clean Energy Federalism, supra note 14, at 344 (describing the 
“panoply of federal and state renewable energy policies”). 
239 See Lazarus, supra note 52, at 850 (urging that serious consideration should be given 
to reforming the structure of environmental policymaking so as to enhance access to relevant 
decisionmaking fora). Beyond the community of legal scholars, Robert Bullard is generally 
credited as the father of the environmental justice movement. See, e.g., Robert D. Bullard, 
Solid Waste Sites and the Black Houston Community, 53 SOC. INQUIRY 273 (1983). 
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cause of disproportionate burdens.”240 This Article’s equity inquiry suggests that 
today’s clean energy policies create similarly pervasive distributional distortions, 
likely due, at least in part, to deficits in participation and transparency. While 
environmental lawmakers are increasingly seeking input from a wide range of 
stakeholders,241 policymakers and regulators rarely manage to muster the same level 
of engagement with the public in the context of energy-related decisionmaking.242 
In a forthcoming article, Professors Shelley Welton and Joel Eisen offer empirical 
evidence suggesting that more widespread public participation in clean energy 
policymaking is prevented by “byzantine decision-making processes” as well as the 
“particularly technical” nature of the issues involved.243  
As the electric grid and other aspects of the energy economy become more 
interactive,244 so, too, should the policy landscape that supports these developments 
become more participatory. With climate change a key driver of the clean energy 
transition, Ostrom’s pitch for more polycentric governance in climate issues readily 
translates to clean energy governance. In a recent study of climate and energy 
programs in Bangladesh, Brazil, China, and Denmark, Professor Benjamin Sovacool 
found that “polycentric approaches to climate and energy governance can offer an 
equitable, inclusive, informative, accountable, protective, and adaptable framework 
for promoting renewable energy.”245 
  
                                                   
240 Alice Kaswan, Environmental Justice: Bridging the Gap Between Environmental 
Laws and Justice, 47 AM. U. L. REV. 221, 223 (1997). 
241 See, e.g., Sheila Foster, Environmental Justice in an Era of Devolved Collaboration, 
26 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 459, 460 (2002) (noting increasing participation by local 
collaborative groups, or “devolved collaboration,” in environmental decisionmaking); 
Kaswan, supra note 240, at 226–27 (describing the Environmental Protection Agency’s 
establishment of the Environmental Equity Workgroup and similar efforts to ensure more 
widespread participation in environmental lawmaking). 
242 Energy regulation is often likened to a black box. See, e.g., Klaus Heine, Inside the 
Black Box: Incentive Regulation and Incentive Channeling on Energy Markets, 17 J. MGMT. 
& GOVERNANCE 157, 158 (2013); KEN BANISTER, NAVIGATING THE BLACK BOX OF ENERGY 
REGULATION: A PEEK INSIDE THE ALBERTA ENERGY REGULATOR 1, http://kbanister.com/dl/ 
Black_Box.pdf [https://perma.cc/9BYF-BJG2]. For an illustrative example of the 
widespread practice of using “black-box settlements” to resolve disputes over the rates for 
energy services and products, see, e.g., City of Osceola v. Entergy Arkansas, Inc., 154 
F.E.R.C. ¶ 61099, 2016 WL 682824, at *5 (F.E.R.C. Feb. 18, 2016). 
243 Welton & Eisen, supra note 17, at 40. 
244 See, e.g., Welton, Clean Electrification, supra note 17, at 583 (“[S]tates are more 
directly mediating the relationship between consumers and electricity, seeking to prompt 
more active grid participation on the part of consumers.”). 
245 Sovacool, supra note 18, at 3842. 
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Building on these insights, policymakers should solicit more widespread 
feedback and participation at the design and implementation stages of the next 
generation of clean energy policies. A better understanding of diverse and often 
competing stakeholder interests will allow for more accurate mapping of the 
anticipated flows of costs and benefits under a policy. Close monitoring of actual 
policy impacts and iterative learning through regular stakeholder participation as 
well as information exchange among policymakers can help fine-tune policies over 
time.  
To be clear, participation is no panacea. More widespread stakeholder 
involvement in the energy policymaking process poses its own challenges. If the 
impact of participatory policymaking is to extend beyond mere lip service, 
institutional frameworks must allow for consideration and incorporation of 
stakeholder input into the actual decisionmaking process. The latter, however, may 
require significant time and resources. The rulemaking process for federal agencies 
under the Administrative Procedures Act (APA)246 aptly illustrates this point. In 
developing the Obama Administration’s Clean Power Plan,247 the Environmental 
Protection Agency (EPA) received well over four million comments on its proposed 
rule.248 The scale of this unprecedented input from states, tribes, utilities, and other 
stakeholders is all the more remarkable considering that EPA followed the APA’s—
theoretically, at least—more streamlined track of notice-and-comment 
rulemaking.249 
Not every institution tasked with energy-related policymaking and regulation 
has the resources required to sift through millions of pages of comments or conduct 
weeks of hearings. This is especially true of institutions at the state, municipal, and 
other subnational levels—the primary fora for clean energy policymaking in recent 
years.250 Any attempts at reform to render decisionmaking processes more 
democratic should, therefore, be careful not to let widespread participation 
overwhelm and, ultimately, paralyze the policymaker or regulator in question. Along 
the way, participatory policymaking may have to move beyond hearings, comments, 
and other traditional methods of soliciting input from the general public. Recent 
scholarship, for example, suggests prediction markets as a means of aggregating and 
                                                   
246 5 U.S.C. § 500 et seq. (2018). 
247 See Carbon Pollution Emission Guidelines for Existing Stationary Sources: Electric 
Utility Generating Units, 80 Fed. Reg. 64, 662 (Oct. 23, 2015) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. 
pt. 60) [hereinafter Clean Power Plan]. 
248 Id. at 64, 663 (pegging the overall number of comments received at 4.3 million).  
249 See 5 U.S.C. § 553. 
250 For an overview of state and municipal policy activism in climate and clean energy, 
see, e.g., Mormann, State Climate Policy Innovation, supra note 111, at 190–91; Kirsten H. 
Engel & Barak Y. Orbach, Micro-Motives and State and Local Climate Change Initiatives, 
2 HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. 119, 123 (2008); Daniel A. Farber, Climate Change, Federalism, 
and the Constitution, 50 ARIZ. L. REV. 879, 883 (2008); Richard B. Stewart, States and Cities 
as Actors in Global Climate Regulation: Unitary vs. Plural Architectures, 50 ARIZ. L. REV. 
681, 683 (2008). 
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evaluating widely dispersed information and expertise in a manner that is both time- 
and cost-effective.251 
Even with these challenges and caveats in mind, the potential to anticipate and 
mitigate, if not altogether avoid, the equity deficits observed under today’s batch of 
clean energy policies suggests that the benefits of more participatory policymaking 
far outweigh the associated costs. Moreover, participatory decisionmaking processes 
have the potential to build greater popular support for climate and clean energy 
policy. The literature has long lamented democratic deficits in the regulatory 
process, suggesting that new laws and policies would meet with greater public 
approval if constituents feel that their voice has, or at least could have, been heard.252 
Greater transparency of the anticipated flows of costs and benefits, meanwhile, 
makes it harder for politicians to highjack clean energy policy as a vehicle for doling 
out favors to special interests thereby reducing the risk of pork-barreling practices 
that have long marred energy policymaking.253  
As the clean energy transition transforms the global energy economy, its 
repercussions are felt across all sectors of society. Decarbonization, therefore, 
cannot proceed successfully without regard for the equity implications of its 
enabling policy landscape. To date, clean energy policymaking primarily follows a 
monocentric, top-down approach with limited opportunity, let alone a sophisticated 
process, for soliciting and considering stakeholder input. A polycentric approach to 
clean energy governance has the potential to accelerate the clean energy transition 
through more effective, better-informed policymaking, while building greater 
popular support for a key component of global efforts to mitigate anthropogenic 
climate change.254 
 
                                                   
251 See Gary Lucas, Jr. & Felix Mormann, Betting on Climate Policy: Using Prediction 
Markets to Address Global Warming, 52 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1429 (2019) (exploring the 
potential for prediction markets to inform the design and implementation of net energy 
metering programs, feed-in tariffs, and renewable portfolio standards, among other clean 
energy policies). 
252  See, e.g., David Arkush, Democracy and Administrative Legitimacy, 47 WAKE 
FOREST L. REV. 611, 611–12 (2012) (“[T]he administrative process is often inaccessible to 
the public . . . and the public lacks tools to assess adequately the quality of regulatory policies 
and outcomes.”); Mark Seidenfeld, A Civic Republican Justification for the Bureaucratic 
State, 105 HARV. L. REV. 1511, 1512 (1992) (arguing that “the political theory of civic 
republicanism, with its emphasis on citizen participation in government and deliberative 
decision-making, provides the best justification for the American bureaucracy”); Paul 
Brest, Further Beyond the Republican Revival: Toward Radical Republicanism, 97 YALE L. 
J. 1623, 1624 (1988) (suggesting that “participatory citizenship is good in itself”).  
253 See WEISS & BONVILLIAN, supra note 63, at 208. 
254 For persuasive evidence of the need to accelerate the clean energy transition, see, 
e.g., Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, Summary for Policy Makers, in GLOBAL 
WARMING OF 1.5°C (2018) (noting that limiting global warming to 1.5 degrees Celsius will 
deliver clear benefits to people and natural ecosystems but requires rapid and far-reaching 
policy action).  
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CONCLUSION 
 
Policymakers and scholars have historically assessed the performance of clean 
energy policies through an efficacy-oriented lens and, more recently, through an 
efficiency-oriented lens. This Article has made the case for adding equity as another 
first-order consideration in the design, implementation, and assessment of policies 
to promote the transition to a clean and decarbonized energy economy. Properly 
defined as the commensurate distribution of costs and benefits, the concept of equity 
offers a more reliable metric than the competing, normatively charged notions of 
fairness that dominate the public discourse today. Doctrinally, equity is no stranger 
to energy law but, rather, deeply rooted in rate design and other staples of public 
utility law.  
For a task as Herculean in scope as the clean energy transition, where timelines 
are measured in decades and capital requirements in trillions of dollars, it is 
important to consider not only the equity of the end goal of decarbonization. Rather, 
any inquiry should logically begin with the distribution of costs and benefits that 
policies create along the way. Accordingly, this Article calls on policymakers and 
scholars to include both the equity of the desired outcome and the equity of the 
enabling policy landscape as they craft the next generation of clean energy policies. 
Application of this metric to a sampling of representative case studies reveals 
significant differences in the policy equity of today’s leading clean energy policies. 
While the present sampling offers but a snapshot of the broader policy landscape, 
the universally observed room for improvement suggests a systemic 
underappreciation of the importance of policy equity. 
Going forward, this Article proposes the polycentric governance model 
championed by Nobel Laureate Elinor Ostrom as a catalyst for more equitable clean 
energy policies. As the clean energy transition continues to make the electric grid 
ever more interactive, the process of policymaking itself must also become more 
participatory. A polycentric approach provides significantly more opportunities for 
experimentation and learning while increasing communication among parties to 
facilitate greater exchange of critical information and build the trust necessary to 
inspire more widespread participation and collaboration. 
 
